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NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

by

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June 1999

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**NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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
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


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
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ABSTRACT

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I. INTRODUCTION

Historically, Europe has been the seedbed of major conflicts, producing two world wars and one Cold War in the twentieth century. But the dramatic political changes in Europe during the late 1980s and early 1990s initiated a process of transition and development in the European security architecture: the iron curtain as the division line in the core of Europe disappeared, there seemed to be no longer the traditional East-West confrontation, and nuclear and conventional mutual threats were no longer the basis for political relations.

The end of the Cold War and the bipolarity between two political systems has not simultaneously put an end to instabilities, however. Many new security risks have emerged not from conflicts *between* states but from conflicts *within* states. Moreover, the recently formed or newly independent post-communist states have to deal with social tensions and political instabilities, and they are engaged in redefining their political interests. Their new motives and objectives unavoidably clash in some cases with the spheres of interest of the established powers, such as Russia. In this situation some elements of the "old" antagonism between Western European states and Russia seem to have revived.

NATO, which was initially formed as a collective defense institution, lost its traditional military *raison d'être* and changed its center of gravity. Both the *old* Europe and the *old* NATO are now dead. Today's NATO faces a strategic environment radically different from that during the Cold War period. Although there is no specific threat to NATO Europe on the horizon, NATO has to keep its defense capabilities in case new threats arise. Moreover, besides increasing political functions, NATO is increasingly focusing on regional collective security rather than on collective defense. The adoption of new missions, referred to as "non-Article 5 missions", and the admission of new members emphasize this transition process. Simultaneously, NATO's enlargement represents a watershed event in European security, putting an end to the immediate post-Cold War era and opening a new stage of integration and consolidation.

This thesis analyzes NATO's development in the post-Cold War era and its future strategic rationale in the light of the overall question:

What are the prospects, risks and challenges for NATO's future adaptation with special regard to the NATO-Russian relationship, the enlargement process, and the formulation of a new Strategic Concept ?

The main argument of this thesis is that NATO is at a crossroads where future adaptation steps have to be carefully evaluated in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. NATO's "open door" enlargement policy has already opened a Pandora's box for the future of the Alliance. Moreover, Russia's transition towards democracy is still under way and the result is an open question. Finally, NATO is transforming its internal and external structures and shape without a valid Strategic Concept that is fully consistent with the current European security environment. Future decisions and developments could easily overburden the Atlantic Alliance and endanger its continued existence. For that reason, NATO has to concentrate on the well-planned, well-timed, and mutually agreed development of its future tasks and missions. The following chapters discuss these topics in detail.

The second chapter – post-Cold War changes in NATO – analyzes the major changes in the European security environment from the end of the Cold War to the present. It clearly points out the changes in security parameters and the general development from antagonism towards security cooperation in Europe. This chapter includes an assessment of new kinds of threats that may menace European stability in the future. Moreover, this chapter also analyzes NATO's adaptation process. The Alliance's starting point is the 1990 London declaration. It officially ended the hostile relationship towards the Warsaw Pact and initiated the Alliance's dual-track policy of defense and cooperation towards Eastern Europe. NATO's April 1999 50th anniversary summit will continue the process but there remains a lot of unfinished business. The series of reform measures and initiatives – referred to as internal and external adaptations – is still not

complete or finished. Everything is in flux and NATO has to take care for the direction and the speed of these developments.

In order to describe NATO's way to the 1999 Washington summit and beyond the third chapter – NATO's role in the European security architecture – analyses three key elements which will decisively influence both NATO and the European security environment. Section A of this chapter – the concept of strategic culture – gives a theoretical background and basis for the analysis of NATO-Russian relations. The analysis of the theory of strategic culture shows that many scholars writing about cultural and historical aspects of nation-states have identified those key variables which determine strategic culture. Moreover, the thesis demonstrates that this theory can also be applied to alliances. In this context NATO represents the strategic culture of Western liberal democracies. Therefore this thesis assumes the basis of commonly agreed, democratic norms and values to be the real glue of NATO. The findings and assumptions of this concept, however, can help to explain actions and decisions which are obviously not based on rational political argumentation and logic.

Section B of the third chapter – the NATO-Russian relationship – analyzes the NATO-Russian Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council in the light of the strategic cultural approach. The thesis considers whether there is a common denominator between the two parties and their different strategic cultures which allows constructive political consultations and cooperation. If so, can we expect in the long run Russia's invitation to join NATO? If not, will China become Russia's new strategic partner? The thesis demonstrates that both alternatives are unrealistic from today's perspective. For this reason, NATO has to concentrate on the establishment of a long- lasting, reliable and resilient relationship with the Russian Federation.

This directly leads to Part C of the third chapter – NATO's enlargement dilemmas – which describes key details of the current enlargement process and analyses how the "open door" enlargement policy upsets NATO's plans for good relations with Russia. The risks and challenges of the allied expansion policy can be summed up by the following three enlargement dilemmas:

- To avoid future new dividing lines within the European security environment the enlargement process seems to include automatically the obligation to continue endlessly NATO's expansion.
- The ongoing enlargement process may increasingly alienate Russia from the West and hamper its development of democratic structures.
- Simultaneously, the enlargement process may foster regionalization tendencies inside NATO and challenge the Alliance's consensus principle.

This part also includes an analysis of future paths of enlargement and the introduction of putative future candidates for NATO membership and their advocates. The thesis concludes that the current enlargement policy is not driven by geostrategic imperatives but primarily by political arguments. This simultaneously implies several matters for conflict in future enlargement discussions. Finally, this section examines with the question "enlargement to what end"? The answers suggest some prerequisites for further expansion waves.

The last section of this chapter – NATO's strategic orientation – analyses NATO's changing multifunctional approach towards peace and stability. NATO transformed from a mainly defense-oriented organization into an institution with decisive political consultative elements. Furthermore, this passage outlines NATO's new Strategic Concept, which will be published at the 1999 summit in Washington. The new concept ought to reflect and outline the Alliance's process of widening and deepening. This section discusses several important issues which may decisively influence NATO's future: Will NATO adopt additional tasks and what will be the priority order between NATO's core function of collective defense and additional "fundamental security tasks"? Will NATO still accept the UN Security Council's predominance with regard to the legitimization of the use of military forces in non-Article 5 missions, or will we observe non-Article 5 operations which just need the approval of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), as with the air operations in the Kosovo conflict since March 1999? These questions go far beyond the discussion of "core functions" and "legitimization" because

they concern NATO's future strategic rationale and answer the important question: What is NATO for? This section of chapter three analyzes and discusses some of the implications imbedded in the above questions.

Chapter IV – NATO after the Washington summit – summarizes the main findings and arguments of this thesis and draws a picture of the Alliance's future within a cooperative European security architecture. Analyzing the above facts, challenges, and circumstances of the future European security architecture, this thesis represents the situation at the end of March 1999. For this reason, neither the outcome of NATO's Washington summit nor the results of the war in Kosovo is included.

II. POST-COLD WAR CHANGES IN NATO

A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPE'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

1. From Cold War to Cooperation

At the end of the 1980s Europe was facing political events and developments which caused revolutionary and persistent changes in the European security architecture. Growing internal economic crises as well as political tensions caused Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-1980s to set the USSR on a course of reform, renewal, and renovation. In socio-cultural areas he invented "*glasnost*" (openness), in economics he implemented "*perestroika*" (restructuring), in politics he pursued "*demokratizatsiya*" (democratization), and in foreign and defense policy he called for "*novoe myshlenie*" (new thinking). Altogether, the inherently new political objectives caused the political détente and led to the historic declaration of US President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev at their summit meeting on 3 December 1989 that the Cold War was now history.¹ This declaration was followed by some tremendous changes in the European security environment. German unification took place. The Warsaw Treaty Organization was disbanded. The Soviet Union collapsed and was replaced by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Twenty new European states were formed or re-emerged. Finally, the Charter of Paris was signed by the 34 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) countries on 21 November 1990. This "Charter for a New Europe" brought adversarial relations to an end and established a framework for future European cooperation which was based on the guiding principles of human rights, democracy and justice. In this context the idea of a new world order was established, as were pressures to collect "peace dividends" after the Cold War.

¹ Rob de Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the New Millenium. The Battle for Consensus* (London, 1997), p. 9.

Within Europe the concept of “interlocking institutions” was born. This key term of the immediate post-Cold War era championed the idea of an extended European security approach resting on a balanced development of political, economic, and military means. During the Cold War each European institution had a clear task, and each was a single-issue institution. Now a system of inter-related and mutually supporting institutions would, it was hoped, face the new challenges. Effective interaction between NATO, the CSCE, the European Union (EU), the Western European Union (WEU), and the Council of Europe was planned to prevent instabilities and crises. But the process of cooperation and coordination among these institutions was long-lasting, difficult, and not always successful. For that reason, this concept of interlocking institutions has been discredited as “interblocking”.

For NATO at that time the question was: what exactly is NATO for? Some observers argued and still maintain that NATO lost its traditional *raison d'être* with the end of the Soviet threat. But these people overlooked the fact that NATO from the very beginning of its existence was a multifunctional security institution. The Alliance nonetheless had to re-examine its structures and tasks conceptually and it had to re-define its priorities. The thesis discusses this topic in detail in Chapter III. Nine years after the Berlin wall came down, the process of defining a new agenda for the European security environment remains an unfinished business. The new security architecture is emerging gradually, through negotiations and treaties on common objectives, norms, and procedures. Before analyzing this process the next section of this thesis briefly points out the new risks and challenges in the new European security environment.

2. New Risks and Challenges

The dramatic political changes in Europe during the late 1980s and early 1990s seem to support the trend of increasing globalization. With the end of the Cold War the bipolarity between the East and the West did not disappear completely. The intense antagonism vanished, but there are still differences in the strategic cultures of Eastern and

Western Europe. For this reason we are currently not facing major military threats but many regional security risks and challenges which make NATO's agenda more challenging than ever before:²

- Russia as one of the major political and military entities within Europe has to finish the reform of its military structures and conceptual realignments. Offensive options in the near abroad and a concept of spheres of influence are incompatible with the political democratization process.
- Democratic developments in other countries of the former Soviet Union are not immune to setbacks. Domestic social, ethnic, religious and economic crises could easily delay, stop, or even reverse the democratization process in these countries. The problem of national minorities abroad is also significant for some of these countries.
- Moreover, historical conflicts have revived, as the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo illustrate. Ethnically rooted wars as well as other domestic and regional conflicts could arise unexpectedly and escalate uncontrollably.
- Political instabilities together with other economic or social problems, but also the violation of human rights and repression, might lead to uncontrolled migration movements, as seen in the case of Albania.
- The supply, distribution, and consumption of non-renewable energy sources and other natural resources constitute another security threat, as the current tensions between Turkey and Syria about water illustrate.
- The aspiration to own weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and relevant delivery means has become widespread. The Iraq example testifies that the threat from biological, chemical and nuclear warfare is genuine. The

² For a description of these new challenges and risks, see William V. Roth, *NATO in the 21st Century* (Brussels, 2 October 1998), pp. 23-34. Available [online] <[http:// www.naa.be/](http://www.naa.be/)>.

proliferation of WMD as well as missile technology will have an increasingly destabilizing effect on the European security environment.

- Furthermore, new global threats such as organized crime, international terrorism, drug and arms trafficking, nuclear smuggling, and environmental pollution, as well as Muslim fundamentalism in North Africa and the unfinished peace process in the Middle East are examples of the increasing number of international trends that directly or indirectly influence peace and stability within Europe.

This description of threats, risks and challenges is clearly based on an enhanced understanding of the security environment. Security in this sense is not only reduced to the military defense of territory. It rather includes a broad variety of issues which influence in different ways and with different intensities the inner and outer security spheres of the nation-state. This is not to say that NATO has to cover the whole spectrum of all these future risks, but NATO's new missions will form the cornerstones of Europe's new security architecture. As a prominent part of the European security system NATO faces a much wider array of threats than in the Cold War period. Although there is no specific threat to NATO Europe on the horizon, NATO has to keep its defense capabilities in case these new threats arise and preventive diplomacy, crisis management, and other measures fail.

B. NATO'S ADAPTATION AND TRANSFORMATION PROCESS

For five decades, the North Atlantic Treaty has formed the basis and the core of the alliance of Western democracies. This alliance will enter the 21st century as an organization in transition facing the new attributes of its security environment. The significant progress of this transition and adaptation process has its origin in the "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance". The Heads of State and Government at their Summit in London in 1990 officially ended the hostile relationship

with the Warsaw Pact and emphasized the dual-track policy of collective defense and a reinforced policy of negotiations and cooperation.³ Adapting the Alliance to the new realities, the London declaration revitalized NATO's political component. This combination of military competence and political consultations led to some remarkable adjustments known as internal and external adaptations.

1. Internal Adaptation

The requirements of the above wide range of challenges but also the opportunity to build a new security structure provided good reasons for the Alliance to reshape its military posture and integrated command structure, to introduce and test the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) principle, to develop the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), and to revise the Strategic Concept.

The very low probability of a large-scale attack and the new security challenges have influenced above all NATO's military posture. It now contains smaller but more flexible and mobile forces which are able to deal with a wide range of eventualities. For this reason, the forces available to NATO are divided into three categories: highly available Immediate and Rapid Reaction Forces, active and mobilisable Main Defense Forces, and Augmentation Forces at varying degrees of readiness and availability, which are also usable for reinforcement purposes. The process of restructuring and reorganization of these forces included also a substantial reduction in numbers by 10 to 40 percent.⁴

³ North Atlantic Council, *London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance* (London, 05.-06. June 1999). Available [online] <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/c900706a.htm>>.

⁴ At the same time defense budgets have been decreased by 30 percent. See NATO, *NATO's New Force Structure*, NATO Basic Fact Sheet No. 5, (Washington D.C., January 1996). Available [online] <<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/nnfs.htm>>.

Moreover, the adaptation of the integrated and formerly static command structure produces a more flexible and deployable chain of command. A new document from the Military Committee “MC 324: The NATO Military Command Structure”, reduces the Alliance’s levels of command from four to three, diminishes the major NATO commands from three to two, and finally streamlines the number of headquarters down from sixty-five to twenty. The development of the CJTF concept went hand in hand with the creation of a mobile force posture and the new command structure. The CJTF as a “deployable multinational, multiservice formation generated and tailored for specific military operations which could involve not only humanitarian relief, peacekeeping or peace enforcement but also collective defense”⁵ provides a nucleus which also allows non-NATO states to participate in NATO-led non-Article 5 contingencies. The military implementation of the CJTF concept is well under way. Three parent headquarters have established CJTF nuclei, and the first trials have been successfully finished. Plans to strengthen NATO’s European pillar, to share increasing responsibilities, and to define an independent European defense capability, or European Security and Defense Identity, were agreed upon in June 1996 in Berlin. The main elements of this initiative include close cooperation between NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) with regard to operational planning, exercises and training, as well as the case by case release of NATO assets for the WEU (“separable but not separate”) for the so-called “Petersberg tasks” including “humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”.⁶

Finally, NATO’s current Strategic Concept, published at the Rome Summit in November 1991, was still based on the old antagonism between NATO and the Soviet Union. This concept called for force structures which would enable the Alliance to

⁵ Anthony Cragg, “Internal adaptation: Reshaping NATO for the challenges of tomorrow”, *NATO Review*, No.4, Vol.45, (July-August 1997), p. 5. Available [online] <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9704-7.htm>>.

⁶ WEU Council of Ministers, *Western European Union Council of Ministers Petersberg Declaration* (Bonn, 19. June 1992), no. II 4.

respond effectively to the changing security environment and thereby initiated the process of force restructuring. The concept also comprised the capability to undertake crisis management and crisis prevention operations, including peacekeeping, which was in 1992 accepted as an additional mission on a case by case basis and under the auspices of the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) which is since December 1994 the successor of the CSCE. But the 1991 Strategic Concept has come to be seen as outdated due to its underlying vision of NATO preserving the strategic balance in a European bipolar power constellation. Thus, the Alliance agreed in the NATO-Russian Founding Act in May 1997 to review the Strategic Concept to ensure that it is fully consistent with the changed security situation. Section C of the following chapter describes the origins and the development of NATO's strategic rationale in detail.

2. External Adaptation

The transformation of the political landscape and especially the changes in NATO's strategic rationale led to the opening for new membership candidates, the establishment of enhanced political relationships with Russia and Ukraine, the establishment of intensified cooperation with new partners in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) which later gave birth to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the launching of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative, and the establishment of the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG). These activities constitute the external adaptations of NATO.

One of the most sensitive issues for NATO is the debate about further new members which was initiated at the Brussels summit in January 1994. NATO's declared "open door" enlargement policy inevitably raised the question "how many are enough?"⁷

⁷ For an explanatory theoretical framework of possible ways of enlargement, see Asmus, Ronald D.; Kugler, Richard L.; Larrabee, F. Stephen, "NATO Enlargement: A Framework for Analysis", in Gordon, Philip H. (editor), *NATO's Transformation. The*

Concentrating on NATO's post-Cold War enlargement, section B of chapter III analyzes the dilemmas of this enlargement policy. Russia, however, has strongly opposed NATO's expansion, especially beyond the "red line" – the imaginary border of the former Soviet Union. The 1997 NATO-Russian Founding Act, establishing the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), serves as a means to reassure Russia that NATO's enlargement will not threaten Russia's integrity. Moreover, the PJC is a unique forum to discuss a broad variety of issues of concern to NATO and Russia. Section B of chapter III analyzes this new strategic relationship in detail. Also during the Madrid summit in 1997 the "Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Ukraine" – the NATO-Ukraine Charter – was signed and thereby the NATO-Ukraine Commission was established. In contrast to Russia, Ukraine favors NATO's enlargement and has actively participated in cooperation initiatives. Kyiv was rewarded with statements of NATO's interest in Ukraine's sovereignty and independence. Thus, the NATO-Ukraine relationship is at present another stabilizing factor in the European security architecture.

Another initiative led in December 1991 to the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which was formed to promote dialogue, cooperation, and partnership between NATO and former members of the Warsaw Pact. In accordance with NATO's new strategic concept, cooperation with the former adversaries should help to avoid the re-emergence of dividing lines and foster the democratization process of the East European countries.⁸

Within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO's military cooperation program, Partnership for Peace (PfP), which has often been interpreted as a preparatory process for NATO membership, was established in January 1994. The PfP initiative promoted military cooperation, transparency, and interoperability between NATO and partner forces. Most advantageously Partnership for Peace emphasizes

Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance, (London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997), pp.93-120.

⁸ NATO Office of Information and Press, *NATO Handbook* (Brussels, 1995), pp. 43-50. Available [online] <<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/home.htm>>.

practical initiatives of cooperation and includes not only former adversaries but many other OSCE countries. Additionally, the Partnership for Peace initiative is deepened and complemented by Individual Partnership Programs (IPP) – bilateral NATO-Partner relationships of an individual scope and pace. In the end this individual choice of bilateral activities makes up the Partnership Work Program (PWP), which is a detailed list of areas of cooperation for the next two years to come. This self-differentiation is a crucial element to meet the different needs and situations of each Partner country.⁹ Beside the enlargement aspect the active engagement in PfP and IPP serves as a preparatory framework and training field for joint action in the Combined Joint Task Force initiative.

The operations in Bosnia, in which Partner forces and even non-European forces have successfully operated with NATO units in IFOR and SFOR missions, clearly demonstrate that NATO is on the right track. It is true that NATO has accepted only limited security obligations to its PfP partners. The North Atlantic Council declared its willingness to discuss with every Partnership for Peace participant perceptions of direct threats – a commitment reminiscent of the spirit of Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. Moreover, in May 1997 the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) was established by the NACC members and the PfP partners with the intention of giving non-NATO participants more influence in the EAPC's decision making. A newly developed EAPC Action Plan includes a short-term plan for consultations and practical cooperation, a long-term program for consultations and cooperation, common activities for civil emergency planning, and extended areas of military-related cooperation under the Partnership for Peace program.¹⁰

Finally, with regard to possible spillovers of new security risks from the Mediterranean region and based on a dialogue with the six Mediterranean countries of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia the North Atlantic Council

⁹ NATO Office of Information and Press, *The NATO Handbook* (Brussels, 1998), pp. 86-90. Available [online] <<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/1998/handbook.pdf>>.

¹⁰ NATO Office of Information and Press, *The NATO Handbook* (1998), pp. 84-85.

declared in 1994 its readiness “to establish contacts, on a case by case basis, between the Alliance and Mediterranean non-member countries with a view to contributing to the strengthening of regional stability”.¹¹ This dialogue aims at the contribution of security and stability to the Mediterranean area and the improvement of the mutual understanding of NATO’s role and function. Based on these objectives the Dialogue consists of regular political discussions as well as military-related information and exchange programs. The 1997 Madrid summit established the Mediterranean Cooperation Group as a consultative body on Mediterranean security issues. Hence this initiative seems to be similar to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council but dedicated to the Mediterranean area.

The above key decisions and course settings reinforce one another and should not be seen separately. Each is indispensable to the success of the others and to the overall development of a new European security environment. But NATO has not reached these objectives completely, and there is a variety of additional problems to solve.

3. Unfinished Business

The process of reorganizing NATO’s internal and external structures is still not complete. NATO’s new integrated military command structure – sometimes referred to as the cement of the Alliance – is described in the Military Committee (MC) document 324 which was endorsed by NATO’s Military Committee on 16 April 1998. This structure has to be revised and adjusted in regard to new members and new security obligations, and it has to be approved by the North Atlantic Council. This requires negotiations about command responsibilities for the new European members as well as arrangements to enable France to return to the integrated military structure if Paris should choose to do so. France is one of the key players in the ESDI initiative. Moreover, after the implementation of Combined Joint Task Force elements, arrangements are necessary to make NATO assets available for the WEU.

¹¹ NATO Office of Information and Press, *The NATO Handbook* (1998), p. 105.

The ongoing discussion of further enlargement rounds will present direct implications for NATO-Russia relations. Tendencies towards Russia's alienation and NATO's expansion eastward have to be carefully balanced. Since this is highly dependent on the political development of Russia, NATO should constantly pursue its attempts to stabilize Russia internally and to promote a constructive strategic relationship. On the other hand, the newly established initiatives have created a variety of fora and institutions, including the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, the Mediterranean Cooperation Group, and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. NATO will have to take care that this institutional overload does not hamper its political decision making process and its working bodies.

With the acceptance of new members the Alliance furthermore takes the risk that internal frictions could threaten NATO's cohesion, as with the example of Greece and Turkey. Thus, NATO has to emphasize its common value and norm system and the consensus principle in order to prevent insoluble bilateral differences which could lead to its division. Similarly, the re-balancing of the US and European roles in the Alliance has to be approached. The intensified burdensharing through an extended implementation of the ESDI could definitely cause some allies to question the US leadership in NATO. This is not to say that the French vision of separating the ESDI from the US commitment is the right way: the ESDI must be developed within a vital transatlantic security system which includes the US military. The American commitment shows at the same time the technological gap between the US and its European allies based on the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). To bridge this gap is one of NATO's crucial tasks in order to maintain NATO's ability for coalition operations.

Finally, all these developments relate strongly to NATO's future strategic orientation and its purposes in the years to come. This topic is the key issue during the preparation phase for the Washington summit in April 1999. The new strategic rationale should finally answer the often-asked questions: What is NATO for – collective defense, collective security, or a mixture of both? Moreover, the question of NATO's future core functions, the discussion of the necessity of legal authorization of non-Article 5

operations involving the use of force, and the relationship with other European security institutions are some of the key issues discussed in this thesis.¹²

¹² An overview about these future tasks is given by William V. Roth, *NATO in the 21st Century*, pp. 31-45.

III. NATO'S ROLE IN THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

This chapter analyzes the new NATO-Russian relationship as an important factor in the new European security environment with special regard to the concept of strategic culture. Therefore, after a brief introduction to the basic ideas and findings of this concept, the chapter investigates the question whether an alliance of independent states itself can have a political-military identity for itself, that is to say a strategic culture. The following part analyzes the strategic culture of Russia and NATO, concentrating on the development of their "domestic" strategic foreign and military policy during the Cold War and the post-Cold War era. Based on the findings and results of this chapter, the thesis finally analyzes the newly established strategic relationship between Russia and NATO with special regard to the following questions: Where are the prospects and the risks of the NATO-Russia Founding Act as well as of the Permanent Joint Council ? Do the parties to the agreement have different expectations and perceptions due to their different strategic cultures or is there a common denominator which allows arrangements and real cooperation? Will Russia be a putative candidate for NATO membership in the foreseeable timespan or are both parties facing to different sets of strategic culture for this option? Will this in the end remarkably influence Russia's strategic rational towards China and create a long term Chinese-Russian alliance? The findings and answers can not comprehensively explain NATO-Russian relations but they could serve as explanations of why some NATO policies concerning relations with Russia could be more successful in the foreseeable period than others and why some Western expectations will probably be disappointed.

A. STRATEGIC CULTURE – OBSTACLE OR CATALYST FOR COOPERATION ?

1. Notion and Content of the Concept

The first efforts to recognize and to understand the interdependence between culture and strategic thinking began with observations about differences in culture and differences in military behavior. Hence, the initial theories argued that the first were the source of the second. Those first imperfect understandings of the impact of culture on strategic behavior have been advanced in the course of time. But even with a lot of research work on the concept of strategic culture the term itself remains loosely defined.

This chapter follows the theoretical approach of Alastair I. Johnston and defines the term “strategic culture” as:

... an integrated “system of symbols” (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.¹³

“Symbols” in this case have to be seen as key variables which really influence strategic preferences. In the course of time the understanding of what these key variables were underwent different interpretations, and this question is still at the core of the discussion about different theories. To understand this “system of symbols” it is helpful to consult Jepperson’s, Wendt’s, and Katzenstein’s findings about the elements that influence national security policy. Balancing neorealism and neoliberalism as the two main theoretical perspectives on international relations, these authors focus on the effects on national security caused by the two factors of “political identity” and the “cultural-

¹³ Alastair I. Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture“, *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4, (Spring 1995), p. 46.

institutional context”.¹⁴ These scholars do not explicitly write about “strategic culture” but they are exactly describing those “symbols” which create and influence Johnston’s “pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences”. In order to outline their theory Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein use the following schema :




Figure 1: Influences on national strategic culture ¹⁵

Environmental structures – most often collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity (“norms”) – shape the national *security interests* and more directly the *security policy* of states. Simultaneously, these norms shape the *state identity*. Thus, changes or variations of *state identity* affect national *security interests* and directly or indirectly the *national policy* of this state. Finally, *state policy* and *state identity* in turn reshape *environmental structures* (“norms”). But, as all scholars point out, the change of norms is definitely to be seen as a long term process.¹⁶ In this sense the cultural elements (“norms”) as well as other cultural institutional elements of the nation’s security environment affect the basic character of this state – or what we called its “strategic

¹⁴ Referring to national security in a broad sense and not only in regard to the military aspects. See Jepperson, Ronald L.; Wendt, Alexander; Katzenstein, Peter J., “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security”, in Peter J. Katzenstein (editor), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York and Chichester/ West Sussex, Columbia University Press, 1996), pp.33-75.

¹⁵ Ibid., p.53.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 52-65.

culture”. After this brief theoretical introduction in the concept the next part examines multinational institutions and their strategic culture.

2. Strategic Culture and Alliances

This chapter will not refer to the traditional alliance theory and its assumptions about balancing, bandwagoning, or threat tethering within alliances.¹⁷ The thesis will rather follow the international relations theory that liberal democracies rarely fight each other. International relations theory justifies this with norm- and identity-based explanations. In this point the thesis refers to the findings of Thomas Risse-Kappen, who explains from a liberal perspective:

Democracies rarely fight each other: they perceive each other as peaceful. They perceive each other as peaceful, because of the democratic norms governing their domestic decision-making process. For the same reason, they form pluralistic security communities of shared values. Because they perceive each other as peaceful and express a sense of community, they are likely to overcome obstacles against international cooperation and to form international institutions like alliances. The norms regulating interactions in such institutions are expected to reflect the shared democratic values and to resemble the domestic decision-making norms.¹⁸

In accordance with these assumptions and findings NATO symbolizes the common identity – or, in other words, the “strategic culture” – of liberal, Western democracies. Key norms as consultations, joint consensus-building, non-hierarchy and codetermination

¹⁷ See, for instance, Patricia A. Weitsman, “Intimate Enemies: The Politics of Peacetime Alliances”, *Security Studies*, vol. 7, no. 1, (Autumn 1997), pp. 156-192.

¹⁸ Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO”, in Peter J. Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, (New York and Chichester/West Sussex, Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 371. This article refers to a book where the scholar analyzes the cooperation among allies under the viewpoints of structural realism, traditional realism, and liberalism. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, *Cooperation among Democracies* (Princeton/NJ, Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 12-41.

transfer basic democratic rules and behavior into this international organization. Moreover, Risse-Kappen argues that collective understanding of appropriate behavior, cooperation rules and procedures, and the inter-allied coordinating and preference-making process constitute the mutual collective identity – or “strategic culture” – of NATO’s security community.¹⁹

In order to analyze strategic cultures Johnston suggests concentrating on strategic culture “artifacts” or “objects of analysis” to discover changes in culturally-based sets of strategic preferences. These objects of analysis could be “writings, debates, thoughts and words of ‘cultural-bearing units’ such as strategists, military leaders and national security elite; weapon designs and deployments; war plans; images of war and peace portrayed in various media; military ceremonies; even war literature”.²⁰ Following the approach suggested by Johnston the next chapters analyzes Russia’s and NATO’s strategic cultures, examining the basic statements and objectives of defense or security policy since the end of the Cold War.

3. The Russian Federation

With the end of World War II Communism’s overlordship installed Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. This status was predominantly based on military capabilities. But growing internal economic as well as political tensions caused Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid - 1980s to set the USSR on a course of reform, renewal, and renovation. Hence, in socio-cultural areas he invented “*glasnost*” (openness), in economics he implemented “*perestroika*” (restructuring), in politics he pursued

¹⁹ Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community”, pp. 369-370.

²⁰ Hence, he regards beside “cognitive mapping” also “symbol analysis” to be helpful tools for the analysis of strategic cultures. See Alastair I. Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture“, pp. 49-55.

“*demokratizatsiya*” (democratization), and in foreign and defense policy he called for “*novoe myshlenie*” (new thinking).²¹ This “new thinking” had three primary components:

- First, the principle of “global interdependence” emphasized that countries worldwide share interests as well as threats; this went beyond the old communist principle of class conflict.²²
- Second, a new state security rejected the old view that only the Soviet military could oppose the capitalist-imperialist threat of the West. Now “comprehensive security”, “mutual security”, “reasonable sufficiency”, and “defensive defense” determined the new foreign and defense policy.
- Third, “comprehensive security” included two dimensions: on the one hand, it recognized new threats like domestic economic decline and political decay, ideological irrelevance, internal and external environmental pollution, and other related issues and on the other hand, it expressed the insight that security could only be guaranteed through political means.

The following changes in the Soviet Union’s military posture and doctrine should serve as proofs of the formal realization of this “new thinking”:

- In January 1986 Gorbachev proposed a 10-year program to eliminate all nuclear weapons which was followed by the ratification of the INF and the START I Treaty.
- In May 1987 the Warsaw Pact’s Political Committee declared its military doctrine and that of its member states to be a strictly defensive one.

²¹ Daniel S. Papp, “The Former Soviet Republics and the Commonwealth of Independent States”, in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti (editors), *The Defense Policies of Nations. A Comparative Study* (Baltimore/Md, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp.192-193.

²² In addition Gorbachev declared in October 1989 in Helsinki the Brezhnev Doctrine formally dead.

- In 1988 Gorbachev announced a 500,000 man unilateral reduction in the Soviet armed forces and the withdrawal of 50,000 Soviet troops from Eastern Europe in support of a defensive military posture.
- In 1989 he announced a production stop for chemical weapons and fissionable material for nuclear weapons.
- And in the same year he additionally announced a force reduction by 120,000 servicemen at the Sino-Soviet border.²³

In sum, these developments were accompanied by Gorbachev's newly developed view of a common European home from the Atlantic to the Urals which must be based on a common identity, that is to say on common Western norms and values, or to put it more concisely, on Western strategic culture. But in the post-Gorbachev era Russia's President Yeltsin started to follow a harder line in foreign and defense policy. The "Principal Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" from October 1993 include the following elements:²⁴

- Russia's Federation has no foreign enemies. Hence, Russia's military doctrine and policies are defensive and the RF has no aggressive intentions. Nonetheless, RF armed forces should aim to deter a large scale conventional threat even by nuclear means.
- Russia's integrity is no point of discussion. The former borders of the Soviet Union are regarded as a zone of vital interest. A direct threat to this "near

²³ Daniel S. Papp, "The former Soviet Republics and the Commonwealth of Independent States", pp. 202-203.

²⁴ There exist fully different assessments of this doctrine. The Strategic Studies Institute presented two independent and differing assessments combined in one article in mid 1994. See James F. Holcomb, Michael M. Boll, *Russia's New Doctrine: Two Views* (Carlisle Barracks/Penn., Strategic Studies Institute, 20 July 1994). Available [online] <<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs94/rusnudoc/docss.htm>>.

abroad” would be the introduction of foreign troops as well as “local wars and armed conflicts”.

- Moreover, special élite Mobile Forces for participation in low-intensity conflicts on former Soviet territory are given priority in military development.²⁵
- Ethnic Russian minorities in non-Russian states will be protected even by the use of military force against the “suppression of the rights, freedom and legitimate interest of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states”.²⁶

Similarly, the “National Security Concept of the Russian Federation” adopted in late December 1997 continued to express objectives like those in the 1993 doctrine.²⁷ In its four sections the 1997 security concept developed the vision of a national interest which requires an active foreign policy to regain the status of a “great power”. Prerequisites for this process included the integration of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the protection of borders, Russian territorial integrity, and support for the constitutional system. The security concept foresaw major threats resulting from political, economic, and ethnic crises as well as from the concentration of hostile armed forces adjacent to Russian territory – obviously a clear reference to NATO’s expansion policy. According to this concept the posture of “realistic deterrence” had to rely on nuclear forces and even on their first use, if necessary. Furthermore, Russia favored a new European-Atlantic security system coordinated by the OSCE and a similar system for the Asia-Pacific region. Local conflicts, Russia argued, should be settled by regional organizations such as the OSCE or the CIS. This vision helps to explain Russia’s indefatigable interest in re-vitalizing and widening the CIS under its control. If necessary,

²⁵ Anton Surikov, “Some Aspects of Russian Armed Forces Reform”, *European Security*, Vol. 6, No. 3, (Autumn 1997), p.61.

²⁶ *Idem.*, pp. 49-50.

²⁷ For a description, see Richard F. Staar, “Russia’s National Security Concept”, *Perspective*, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (January-February 1998). Available [online] <<http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol8/Staar.html>>.

coercive measures were regarded as adequate means to serve this end, as the example of Georgia proves.

This national security concept was only one element in a series of reform measures in this period. In 1997 Boris Yeltsin issued and started to implement several decrees to reshape the armed forces. These decrees do not signify a real military reform since each of the key players in this reform process – the president himself, the prime minister, the foreign minister, the defense minister and the secretary of the defense council – follow different personal goals.²⁸ Today's Russian military is still lacking any kind of civilian democratic control. The General Staff has full control over the armed forces, whereas the defense ministry only carries out administrative responsibilities. Moreover, plans to decentralize the armed forces and to shift responsibilities to the district commanders are additionally endangering any possibilities for central control over the forces. Hence, Stephen J. Blank concludes his analysis of the Russian armed forces with the statement that "Russia is not a democratic state, and arguably is not moving further towards democracy. Neither is it stable or predictable".²⁹ Russia's minister of defense, however, has not get tired of emphasizing that "Russia's military potential is exclusively aimed at maintaining its own security and poses no threat to other states and nations. Russia is therefore justified in expecting corresponding moves from the other major military powers and above all from NATO."³⁰

Altogether, it is remarkable that in the eighth year after one of the major revolutions in Russian history foreign and defense policy are still in a state of flux and missing particular elements for stability. The strategic rationale of "defensive defense" remains as

²⁸ For a detailed analysis, see Stephen J. Blank, "Russia's Armed Forces on the Brink of Reform" (Carlisle Barracks/Penn., Strategic Studies Institute, 16 March 1998). Available [online] <<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs98/>> .

²⁹ *Idem.*, p. 36.

³⁰ Marshal Igor Sergeyev, "We are not adversaries, we are partners", *NATO Review*, No.1, (Spring 1998), pp. 4-5. Available [online] <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9801-04.htm>>.

vague as it was under Gorbachev.³¹ Moreover, out of several paradoxes in the current Russian defense posture described by Alexei G. Arbatov, the absence of civilian control of the military and the ongoing planning for contingencies such as large-scale wars in the west, south and east are in strong contrast to the declared new strategic guidelines.³² The thesis will come back to this point in discussing the elements of a new strategic partnership between Russia and NATO. The deterrence role of nuclear forces serves clearly as a marker to China and other potential nuclear adversaries. In conclusion the Russian security doctrine can be regarded under three aspects:

- Militarily, it includes a more rational view of the military reality without the former ideological aspects. However, it clearly overestimates conventional military capabilities. Meanwhile, Russian financial circumstances are so disastrous that the General Staff has made plans to reduce the armed forces on about another 50% to a total of about 600,000 servicemen.³³
- Internally, it describes potential risks and warns potential challengers to the current regime.
- Externally, it describes the new relationship to adjacent states, emphasizing a close relationship with the CIS memberstates and the role of “peacekeeping” military operations in the “near abroad”.

³¹ Some authors even state that there is no national security concept. See, for instance, Richard F. Staar, *The New Military in Russia. Ten Myths that shape the Image* (Annapolis/Md, Naval Institute Press, 1996).

³² Alexei G. Arbatov, *The Russian Military in the 21st Century* (Carlisle Barracks/ Penn., Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 3 June 1997). Available [online] <<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs97/rusmil21/rusmilss.htm>>.

³³ N.N., “Russische Armee steht vor dramatischem Aderlaß”, *rp-online Topnews aktuell*, (10. 02. 1999). Available [online] <http://rp-online.de/topnews/990210/russland_armee.shtml>.

The implications of this conflict about national security interests and military reform had been predicted by Stuart D. Goldman, who concluded that the collapse of the Russian Army without effective reform measures would threaten Russia's democratic transition in particular and European stability in general. Hence, reform measures should lead to smaller, more efficient, professional Russian force. It is thus now imperative for the West to reassure Russia. This chapter of the thesis will now analyze whether the NATO-Russian Joint Permanent Council is an appropriate means to do so.³⁴

4. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO's initial military strategy was set forth in the late 1940s and early 1950s with "The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area" and the "Medium Term Defense Plan".³⁵ Both documents were based on the assumption that any war with the Soviet Union would be a total one. The Alliance, it was assumed, would be forced to use every weapon at its disposal. This implied an immediate massive nuclear counteroffensive to destroy the Soviet Union's military capabilities and to end any further conventional assaults. The revision of this strategy led in 1954 to the Military Council document 48 (MC 48) which still emphasized the importance of nuclear and even tactical nuclear weapons. This strategy threatened massive retaliation by US nuclear forces in the event of any kind of Soviet attack. The idea of a general nuclear response to any Soviet aggression changed with the development of improved Soviet nuclear capabilities and the emerging nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. From the very moment the Soviet Union could threaten American soil the strategy of "massive

³⁴ Although Goldmann drew his conclusions for US policy they seem to be helpful for NATO at all. See Stuart D. Goldmann, *Russian Armed Conventional Forces: On the Verge of Collapse?* (Washington/D.C., The Library of Congress, 4 September 1997), pp. 50-54.

³⁵ John S. Duffield, *Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO's Conventional Force Posture* (Stanford/CA, Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 29.

retaliation” increasingly lost its credibility due to the question whether the United States would risk its own territory to defend that of NATO’s European allies. Mutual vulnerability seemingly offered only two options: suicide or surrender. The absence of other alternatives made this strategy increasingly incredible.³⁶ The credibility of NATO’s strategic posture was regained with the acquisition of capabilities for a balanced and controlled use of both nuclear and conventional forces. This vision led finally in 1967 to the adoption of MC 14/3, commonly known as the strategy of “flexible response”.³⁷ This last formal strategic review during the Cold War delivered with MC 14/3 three options for military response due to different levels of aggression. As Rob de Wijk explains:

Direct Defense was the first military answer to aggression from the East. The basic idea was that the reaction would be appropriate to the amount of force used by the Warsaw Pact. Because of the numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact the rapid use of nuclear weapons was maintained as an option. The aim was to leave the choice of escalation to the adversary. Deliberate escalation, the next step, represented an ascent of the escalation ladder. Slowly the military pressure on the aggressor would be increased, and in doing so selective first use of nuclear weapons remained an option. Finally, the strategy provided for a ‘general nuclear response’ in which all available tactical and strategic nuclear weapons are used ...³⁸

An important new element – the concept of forward defense – was implemented with plans to take up delaying and defense operations directly along the border between the two Germanies. This strategy of “flexible response” remained valid up to the time of the end of the Cold War in 1989. After the London Declaration the ad hoc Strategic Review Group met for the first time on 14 September 1990. The objective of this

³⁶ Rob de Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the New Millenium*, p.8. For a detailed description of the implications of the MC 48, see John S. Duffield, *Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Force Posture*, pp. 75-111.

³⁷ For a detailed description of the intermediate strategy MC 14/2, see John S. Duffield, *Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Force Posture*, pp. 112-150.

³⁸ Rob de Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the New Millenium*, p. 8.

committee was to present a definitive version of a new strategic concept by early 1991. But constant changes in the international environment and different views about how to handle them impeded the work of the Strategic Review Group. This working body had to write a new military document which would translate the political Strategic Concept published in Rome 1991 into basic principles for the Major NATO Commanders. In the logical sequence of its predecessors the title MC 14/4 had been proposed. But in order to demonstrate the change of course it ultimately was titled MC 400, or "MC Directive for Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategic Concept" and approved in December 1991. The MC 400 recognized the unpredictability of future security risks and challenges. For that reason, it foresaw the necessity for more flexible and mobile forces which led to the emphasis on force build-up capacities. Basically, the final document described a new force structure consisting of mobile reaction forces on high readiness, heavier main defense forces at a lower state of readiness, and mobilisable augmentation forces. The goal of this new structure was to be able to oppose the residual threat with fewer units. This ultimately led to a reduction of NATO peacetime forces by an average of 25 percent compared to 1990. In addition to these reductions multinationality became an important new element of this strategy, despite all criticisms about an obvious reduction in military effectiveness. Additionally, the most important contribution was the implementation of the "Counter-Concentration" concept:

The new structure supplanted forward defense with its allocation of army corps regions along the former border between East and West Germany. This, in combination with the reduced forces, led SACEUR to replace the relatively static linear forward defense along the border between East and West Germany with a concept based upon high mobility. This mobile Counter-Concentration Concept was based upon the rapid movement of reaction forces and main defense forces to places where a breakthrough could be forced.³⁹

³⁹ Rob de Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the New Millenium*, p. 44.

This concept clearly serves as a proof for NATO's military strategic adaptation to the new geostrategic realities. It is based on a residual threat assumption which reflects Russia's long-term potential to reconstitute capabilities for a large scale, surprise assault. Furthermore, the idea of highly mobile and quickly deployable reaction forces simultaneously supports NATO's newly adopted missions. An adaptation and clarification of this military document started in 1994 with the Long-Term Study. A new MC 400 should be developed including the full participation of France in the integrated military structure, the idea of a more regionalized collective defense, and reduced differences between Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations in terms of operational planning procedures. These efforts ended up with the approval of MC 400/1 in June 1996. Still based on the political guidelines of the 1991 Strategic Concept, this document confirmed the above threat assessment as concerns the prospect of a full scale attack and in favor of regional developing threats. Furthermore, proliferation of WMD as well as the missile threat were addressed. But its key elements were the new missions requirements and their influence on the integrated command and force structure. The core function of collective defense no longer differs remarkably from crisis management outside the treaty area. This newly adopted task includes both Article 5 and non-Article 5 functions. Consequently, NATO's military assets as well as its command structure have to establish flexibility to support both functions.⁴⁰

This last development again proves NATO's adaptation from a Cold War defense institution towards a cooperative security organization at the end of this century. The improvement of military strategy and effectiveness was clearly initiated and driven by a realistic and flexible threat analysis, not against other militaries, nations or perceived threats but in favor of peace and stability within Europe. Security is no longer spelled in terms of the defense of the territorial integrity of the Allies but in terms of the protection of European interests and values against a variety of new challenges and risks.

⁴⁰ Rob de Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the New Millenium*, pp. 101-115.

B. THE NATO - RUSSIAN RELATIONSHIP

1. The Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council

Simultaneously with the dissolution of the Soviet Union it was clear that Russia had to be included in the process of reshaping the future European security environment. Moreover, due to Russia's disapproval of any NATO enlargement and its sporadic engagement in the PfP, NATO felt obliged to give Russia an appropriate place in Europe's security environment establishing a special relationship with this country. Against this background in December 1996 in Brussels NATO's Secretary General was asked to explore the feasibility of an agreement to improve NATO-Russian relations. This led to the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation" – Founding Act for short – which was signed in Paris on 27 May 1997. In its second paragraph the Founding Act declares that:

NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. They share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and strengthening mutual trust and cooperation. The present Act reaffirms the determination of NATO and Russia to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its peoples. Making this commitment at the highest political level marks the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between NATO and Russia. They intend to develop, on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency a strong, stable and enduring partnership.⁴¹

Within its four sections the parties to the Founding Act specify the principles of their partnership, establish the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), develop the different topics for consultation and cooperation, and finally define future areas of military cooperation. Describing principles for future cooperation Section I primarily

⁴¹ NATO, *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation* (Paris, 27 May 1997). Available [online] <<http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/fndact-a.htm>>, p. 1.

emphasizes the role of the OSCE as the key actor for crisis management and peacekeeping. Hence, the Founding Act should not affect the relevance of the OSCE as well as the UN in maintaining peace and stability. Furthermore, the parties acknowledge democracy, political pluralism, the rule of law, respect for human rights and civil liberties, respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states, the inviolability of borders and peoples' right of self-determination, peaceful conflict settlement, and mutual transparency in regard to defense policies and military doctrines as guiding principles for their relations.

Section II discusses the PJC as the prime mechanism for consultation and cooperation and how this mechanism will work. The JPC will hold regular consultations - twice annually at the level of Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers and also monthly at the level of ambassadors or permanent representatives. It will also develop joint initiatives and take joint action if consensus has been reached. This new forum will discuss nearly the complete range of political and security-related issues as outlined in Section III. This shall include the mutual information on strategies, doctrines, and military infrastructure.

The final section of the Founding Act covers some special political-military topics. NATO reiterates that it has no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon storage sites on the territory of new members. Both parties agree to adapt the 1990 CFE Treaty to the new European security environment, aiming at a significant lowering in the total amount of Treaty-limited equipment. This chapter also calls for greater transparency, predictability and mutual confidence with regard to the armed forces. Hence, enhanced dialogue, practical activities and direct cooperation are to be improved. In general, the Founding Act in general does not subordinate NATO to any other organization or allow consultations about internal matters of NATO, NATO members or Russia. Moreover, the Founding Act does not supply NATO or Russia with a veto right over the other party nor does it restrict the parties' right for independent decision-making and action.

“Milestone or Trojan Horse?” The question raised by Karl-Heinz Kamp describes the risks and simultaneously the chances included in the Founding Act. It is fact that the Founding Act is a political agreement but not a binding international treaty founded on the basis of reciprocity and transparency. Proceeding on this assumptions Kamp predicts that the Founding Act will have to be interpreted with a view to the future political framework parameters, especially those for Russia’s future development.⁴² This chapter of the thesis will not discuss all the elements of Kamp’s analysis but concentrate on the arguments opposing and supporting the Founding Act.

Critics argue that the Foundation Act could undermine NATO’s cohesion and ability to act. The existence of the North Atlantic Council, the EAPC, and the PJC could hamper a quick decision-making process within NATO. Furthermore, the PJC gives Russia a *de facto* political influence over the decision-making autonomy of NATO. For this reason the Russian Minister of Defense, Marshal Igor Sergeyev, stated that “...there are fears that these arrangements [permanent consultations, extending cooperation, and mutually acceptable solutions in the framework of the PJC] may not be implemented in full. These fears would prove to be justified if Russia’s role in the Permanent Joint Council was arbitrarily restricted.”⁴³ But both arguments neglect the fact that the North Atlantic Council is the only decision- making body which seems to be able and willing to agree on solutions, as the example of the Kosovo conflict proves. Further criticism deplores NATO’s self-restraint with regard to the stationing of nuclear and conventional armed forces on the territory of new members. This includes the absence of an analogous obligation for Russia, for instance in the Kaliningrad enclave. These arguments suggest that the Founding Act will make contingency planning more difficult but not impossible. Moreover, highly sophisticated military technology – at least in the case of nuclear forces – allows NATO to give a security guarantee for a region even without large numbers of

⁴² Karl-Heinz Kamp, “The NATO-Russia Founding Act. Trojan Horse or Milestone of Reconciliation?”, *Aussenpolitik*, vol. IV (1997), pp. 319-320.

⁴³ Marshal Igor Sergeyev, “We are not adversaries, we are partners”, p. 5.

forces deployed in that region. The same reasoning applies to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. Finally, critics argue that the Founding Act is an agreement behind the backs and at the expense of the Baltic states. This argument is invalid since the adoption of the US-Baltic Charter in early 1998.

The Founding Act's supporters argue that Russia's influence on NATO through the PJC is mainly determined by Russia's international influence and on the degree of solidarity within NATO. Since the former is at a low level of significance, NATO's solidarity is even more important for the future role of the alliance. But since NATO has proved to have a high level of cohesion, there is no need to worry about undue Russian influence. Another strong argument in favor of the Founding Act states that the agreement additionally enables the Alliance to exert influence on the Russian side, a vision which must be proved by events. Finally, the Founding Act could simply be regarded as an attempt by the Russian government to save its face in front of its people.⁴⁴

The discussion about the Founding Act and the PJC will remain controversial. The PJC is at this time not suited to resolve all the problems of a future European security architecture. Even if Russia tries to use the PJC as a means to transform NATO, as stated by Russia's foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov⁴⁵ and even if the efforts at cooperation had got off to a slow start the PJC will be a unique forum for discussion and information exchanges, thereby fostering stability and security all over Europe. The newly developed European security architecture is no longer a zero-sum security competition between former rivals in which the one's loss is simultaneously the other's gain. The multiple integration of Russia within the PFP, the PJC and the EAPC is a unique opportunity and also a challenge for Russian engagement and responsibility for the future European stability based on Western values and norms. Hence, it is simultaneously the touchstone

⁴⁴ For a discussion of the pros and cons, see Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The NATO-Russia Founding Act. Trojan Horse or Milestone of Reconciliation?", pp. 320-323.

⁴⁵ N.N., "...As NATO and Russia launch new Joint Council", *Monitor: a Daily Briefing on the Post-Soviet States*, Vol. 3, Issue 180 (September 29, 1997). Available [online] <http://www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/mon/003/180_008.htm>.

for Russia's newly introduced strategic culture. The potential long term implications of this new strategic partnership will be questioned in the following section of this chapter.

2. Russia into NATO?

Since NATO started its enlargement policy the possibility of a future Russian membership in NATO has been controversially discussed within the alliance as well as in Russia itself. In order to answer the question this thesis analyzes the prospects for as well as the risks associated with proposals for a democratic Russia included in NATO.

Some observers argue that Russia's membership in NATO would give the Alliance new impetus and additional political and military influence. NATO's enlargement policy would no longer face dilemmas such as the potential Russian alienation, the creation of new dividing lines, or the special problem of the Baltics. In the long term at least all European states could expect to join NATO. Russia's premature democracy itself could benefit from the intensified cooperation with Western democracies within NATO. But this prospect could simultaneously raise some serious risks and challenges. Critics often argue that Russia's membership in NATO could mean abandoning NATO's collective defense posture. What could be the result, if for instance Russia and Lithuania, both as members of the Alliance, attempted to solve their quarrels about transportation rights towards Kaliningrad by military means? First, the solution of NATO's internal conflicts might lead to a collective security approach. Moreover, the Alliance's consensus principle would result in NATO's immobility because definitely one of the belligerent parties would "veto" any NATO action. NATO would end up as a coalition of the willing, and its Article 5 pledge could lose its credibility.

Other critics argue that Russian membership in NATO might subordinate the Europeans to a US-Russian dyad of power. But the historic review shows reasons for US supremacy in NATO other than only the US nuclear umbrella, such as extensive US financial commitments to NATO. For the time being Russia does not seem to have the economic or military potential to make a similar contribution in order to gain comparable

influence. Finally, some argue that a NATO including the Russian Federation could be forced to show responsibility to protect Russia against China or other Asian powers.⁴⁶ This is indeed a very strong argument but it overlooks the powerful persuasive effect of NATO's Article 5 security pledge. Would China really dare to provoke a member of such a powerful alliance? The next section of this chapter will analyze the question more detailed.

In sum the possible disadvantages clearly outweigh the prospects for a future Russian membership, leaving aside the open question of Russia's willingness to join NATO. Thus, NATO would seem to be wise in the years to come to accept Russia's indispensable engagement for the future stability of Europe outside the alliance. Nonetheless, NATO must not fail to take into account the uncertainties regarding Russia's willingness and ability to serve as a major player in reshaping the European security environment.

3. China's Strategic Influence

China's influence and role must be seen within the context of Asia's geopolitical structure and the interests of America, Japan, Russia, Korea, India, and other Asian powers in this region. With special regard to Russia and China first, there is the remarkable reconciliation about the Sino-Russian border dispute which dated back for centuries. In 1989 Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev initiated efforts to repair ties and started demarcation talks which ended in 1991 with a border agreement followed by the practical demarcation process. This agreement was renewed in April 1997 when China, Russia, Tadjikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan agreed on troop reductions and security-building measures along their 4700 mile long common border line.

⁴⁶ For the criticisms, see for instance David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington/D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), pp. 145-151.

But as in the European theater, Russia's Asian security perspectives are highly influenced by traditional power and geopolitical considerations. Russia's *Realpolitik* still sees Asia's security first of all in military terms.⁴⁷ Moreover, this militarized view fosters Russia's political isolation and insecurity in Asia due to its military weakness. This, however, strengthens Russia's domestic anti-reform coalition, which in turn forces Russia to align itself with China as the most significant Asian option. First attempts to harmonize relations with China started in December 1996 when during a Sino-Russian summit a "strategic partnership" between these two powers was established. It has been regularly refreshed by follow-on summits. Based on the "Primakov Doctrine", this partnership is explicitly directed against the United States and increasingly ruled by Beijing.⁴⁸ As Stephen J. Blank describes it:

Russia's geopolitical motives for friendship with China are clear. Russia needs a friendly China to avert threats across its Asian frontiers where its military power is eroding daily. Russian Asia remains an economy of force theater that cannot be adequately defended now or for a long time. Therefore, it is threatened potentially by land from China and by sea from Japan and the United States. Russia ... needs China's markets. It also needs arms sales, peace along the borders with Central Asia that historically have been an object of considerable rivalry, and China's help to enter into the Asian economic-political order. Most of all, Russia needs China to counter U.S. pressure.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ For a detailed analysis of this perspective, see Stephen J. Blank, *Why Russian Policy is Failing in Asia* (Carlisle Barracks/Penn., Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2 April 1997), part VI. Available [online] <<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs97/failng/failngp6.htm>>.

⁴⁸ This name was invented by Ariel Cohen in his article "The 'Primakov Doctrine': Russia's Zero-Sum Game with the United States", *The Heritage Foundation*, FYI No. 167, (December 1997). p. 1. Available [online] <<http://www.heritage.org/library/categories/forpol/fyi167.html>>.

⁴⁹ Stephen J. Blank, *The Dynamics of Russian Weapon Sales to China* (Carlisle Barracks/Penn., Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 4 March 1997), part III. Available [online] <<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs97/ruswep/ruswep3.htm>>.

Owing in part to its interest in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, China promotes this strategic partnership with Russia. This “agreement” releases Chinese forces from the Sino-Russian border. Beijing has always emphasized that its ties with Moscow are a model for a different form of regional security architecture but that they are not allied against any other party.⁵⁰

What are finally the implications for NATO? The Alliance should deepen and intensify its efforts to engage Russia in the construction of the future European security architecture. If Russia chose to become a competitive rival or even a strategic adversary of NATO, it could attempt to balance the Alliance’s power geostrategically by allying or aligning with China against the United States and the West in general. This nationalist approach of Russian imperial geopolitics would be in some ways a worst case scenario for Europe, and it would be good if those scholars are proven correct in the end who state that “Moscow’s recent attempts to countervail the influence of the West by creating alliances with Asian countries do not have a serious potential for success”.⁵¹ But owing to the latest events in the Kosovo war, this Sino-Russian partnership gains a new and powerful impetus.

⁵⁰ The Chinese viewpoint is for instance described by Ronald N. Montaperto and Hans Binnendijk, “PLA Views on Asia Pacific Security in the 21st Century”, *Strategic Forum*, No. 114, (June 1997). Available [online] <<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum114.html>>.

⁵¹ Vladimir Shlapentokh, ‘Old’, ‘New’ and ‘Post’ Liberal Attitudes Toward the West: *From Love to Hate*, paper published 20. August 1998 by Special Adviser for Central & Eastern European Affairs, NATO secretariat, p. 3.

C. NATO'S ENLARGEMENT DILEMMAS

1. The first Enlargement Round

Since there already took place three past expansions the title of this section is misleading: Greece and Turkey were admitted in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. In 1990, moreover, Germany's reunification added the territory of the former German Democratic Republic to the Alliance. But these admissions⁵² happened during and at the end of the Cold War period. During that time there was little controversy about the acceptance of the new members. However, the legal basis for these past and future enlargements is Article 10 of the Washington Treaty:

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.⁵³

The first post-Cold War enlargement round was prepared by US President Clinton's administration in the second half of 1993 and initiated at the Brussels December 1994 ministerial meeting with the following declaration:

... we have decided to initiate a process of examination inside the Alliance to determine how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide this process and the implications of membership. To that end, we have directed the Council in Permanent Session, with the advice of the Military Authorities, to begin an extensive study. This will include an examination of how the Partnership for Peace can contribute concretely to this process. ⁵⁴

⁵² The terms "enlargement", "expansion", and "admission" stand for the same process: the formal integration of new candidates into NATO.

⁵³ NATO Office of Information and Press, *NATO Handbook* (1995), appendix VIII.

⁵⁴ NATO, *Final communiqué. Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council* (Brussels, 1 Dec. 1994), No. 6. Available [online] <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/c941201a.htm>>.

Germany strongly supported this initiative. But since some other allies wanted to explore this issue first, the “Partnership for Peace” (PfP) program was established in January 1994 to provide a framework for evaluating states which were interested in joining NATO. Already after NATO’s January 1994 summit President Clinton stated that NATO’s expansion was no longer a question of “whether” but of “when” and “how” new candidates could join NATO.⁵⁵ A widely publicized study on NATO enlargement released in September 1995 only analyzed the questions of “why” and “how” to enlarge the Alliance but did not say anything about “who” and “when”. The six chapters of NATO’s enlargement study analyzed in detail how the enlargement process might contribute to the stability and security of the entire Euro-Atlantic area, strengthen the Alliance’s effectiveness, and support the objective of an undivided Europe. It furthermore explained the rights and obligations for new members as well as the modalities of the enlargement process.⁵⁶ Universally valid prerequisites or criteria for integration were never commonly defined. This should be done on a case by case basis. But general standards would include active participation in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace initiative, the successful establishment of democratic structures, a market economy, respect for human rights and peaceful relations with adjacent states.

In their study in Spring 1995 about an analytical framework for this enlargement Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee pointed out three possible “paths” for NATO’s future enlargement.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ A detailed analysis of the process leading to this situation can be found in an article by James M. Goldgeier, “NATO expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision”, *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 1998), pp. 85-102.

⁵⁶ NATO, *Study on NATO Enlargement* (Brussels, 1995).

⁵⁷ Some other scholars even discuss alternative future security alignments which do not include NATO’s expansion. See, for instance, James W. Morrison, *NATO Expansion and Alternative Future Security Alignments* (Washington D.C., Institute for Strategic Studies, McNair Paper 40, April 1995), chapter 3. Available [online] <<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/macnair/m040ch03.html>>.

- The “evolutionary expansion” is based on the assumption of mainly economic and political problems in East-Central Europe (ECE). Hence, the European Union (EU) must have first priority to integrate new states of ECE. Membership in NATO is seen as secondary to membership in the EU.
- The “promote stability” approach assumes the necessity of a security framework for the development of stable democracies in ECE. In this alternative NATO has to anchor countries in their strategic “no-man’s land” to the West, and this should consequently stabilize ECE as a whole.
- The “strategic response” solution foresees NATO enlargement only at that moment when Russia would start to move in an authoritative or expansionist direction. Western policy should concentrate on Russia’s political stabilization and NATO should play its old fashioned collective defense role.⁵⁸

Besides demands for an appropriate choice of a future enlargement policy the authors emphasized the necessity for NATO to decide what defense concept, military strategy and force goals are suitable for an expanded Alliance. This necessity is still valid today as well as partly unfulfilled.

The December 1996 Brussels ministerial meeting was another step forward in the enlargement process. Its final communiqué recommended

... to invite at next year's Summit meeting one or more countries which have participated in the intensified dialogue process, to start accession negotiations with the Alliance. Our goal is to welcome the new member(s) by the time of NATO's 50th anniversary in 1999. We pledge that the Alliance will remain open to the accession of further members in accordance with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. ⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Asmus, Ronald D.; Kugler, Richard L.; Larrabee, F. Stephen: “NATO Enlargement: A Framework for Analysis”, pp. 93-120.

⁵⁹ NATO, *Final communiqué. Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council* (Brussels, 10. Dec. 1996), No. 6. Available [online] < <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96-165e.htm>>.

This clearly was the beginning of a “promote stability path” which was chosen in connection with the declaration of an “open door” enlargement policy. NATO enlargement was then a prominent issue, and the United States and Germany in particular were facing extensive debates about the implications and the pros and cons of the alliance’s expansion. Finally, the questions of “who” and “when” were officially answered at the NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997:

Today, we invite the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks with NATO. Our goal is to sign the Protocol of Accession at the time of the Ministerial meetings in December 1997 and to see the ratification process completed in time for membership to become effective by the 50th anniversary of the Washington Treaty in April 1999.⁶⁰

The protocols of accession were signed by the NATO Foreign Ministers in December 1997, and after the ratification process in 1998 these three new members were formally admitted to the Alliance on 12 March 1999. But the list of potential new member states was much longer in the mid-1990s when NATO officially decided to enlarge. There were also remarkably different positions among the allies with regard to the questions of whom to champion and whom to refuse. The remaining countries on the list of potential candidates are automatically the basis for the discussion of future enlargement rounds. Before introducing these putative new NATO members the following chapter analyzes and discusses the three most serious concerns about the possible implications of the expansion process.

⁶⁰ NATO, *Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation* (Madrid, 8 July 1997), paragraph 6.

2. New Dividing Lines

The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in the early 1990s left a remarkable geopolitical vacuum in East- and Southeast-Europe. For this reason, the new states in this European region which came into being shortly after the liberation from communism are facing new instabilities, security risks, and security related challenges. Since these states were looking for new security arrangements and since the West intended to fill this geopolitical vacuum, NATO as well as other European institutions expanded towards the East as a logical consequence. But NATO's first enlargement round gave only three new members the complete security guarantees of the Alliance, and this will probably create new dividing lines within Europe at least in the perception of some countries.⁶¹ What will be the reaction of the putative candidates of the next enlargement wave and what about those states, such as Ukraine, which have not yet applied for NATO membership? To postpone NATO's next expansion steps for many years could give these states as well as Russia the signal that these countries are isolated and subject to Russia's influence. Hence, to avoid the risky and expensive re-nationalization of defense and a resurgent Russia in Europe NATO is facing its first enlargement dilemma: the enlargement process seems to be an automatic mechanism which obligates the Alliance to make predictions about the next expansion round at the 1999 Washington Summit in order to prevent dividing lines as well as to maintain the credibility of its "open door" policy.

⁶¹ Some scholars even argue that purposefully drawn lines between East and West would again bring clarity and predictability to European security. See, for instance, Stephen Pelz's view in Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security* (Lanham/MY and Oxford/GB, 1998), p.104.

3. Russia's Alienation

NATO enlargement is not an end in itself, but a means to promote security and stability all over Europe. But this vision must not exclude Russia. This has also been recognized and widely accepted in NATO. Hence, with the invitation of three new members at the 1997 Madrid summit NATO almost simultaneously established a new strategic relationship with Russia and Ukraine on the basis of the NATO-Russia Founding Act as well as the NATO-Ukraine Charter. Nonetheless, NATO's process of exporting stability by enlargement is regarded by many as an exploitation of Russia's current weakness. Alain Pellerin called this situation Russia's "Versailles Syndrome" and concluded that NATO should treat Russia as a valued and respected partner in order to avoid Russia's isolation from the West.⁶² But the perceived reality is far away from this vision. During a press briefing in February 1998 the chairman of the Russian Duma's Committee on International Affairs, Vladimir Lukin, stated:

The problem is whether Russia is considered part of the Atlantic community or not. Russia will have to decide how it is being considered – as an equal partner or an outsider. NATO enlargement is isolating Russia. What is the choice for us? Only to be an outsider. Not a hostile outsider, but still an outsider. It is a danger. We will become stronger, and we are still a nuclear power. It is a danger to us and a danger to you. A few years ago there was the idea of partnership, now there is a strong hesitation in the United States.⁶³

Scholars such as Leon Gouré interpret this kind of behavior as "mischief making". Besides organizing alliances in opposition to NATO, altering the arms control regime, and pursuing military responses, this kind of Russian foreign policy attempts to resort to countermeasures opposing NATO's expansion. As Gouré explains:

⁶²Alain Pellerin, "NATO Enlargement: The Way Ahead", *Global Beat*, (14 February 1998). Available [online] <<http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nato/pellerin021498.html>>.

⁶³N.N., "The Russian Reaction to NATO Expansion", *Global Beat*, Global Beat Issue Brief No. 28 (February 24, 1998). Available [online] <<http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/pubs/ib28.html>>.

Russia's pretensions to be recognized as a "great power" with global interests and an influential voice in global affairs exceed by far its capabilities to make such a claim credible. As a result, Moscow has suffered frustrations and humiliations when it has been ignored by the United States, NATO, or other states where it sought to play a role. In turn, this has fueled Russian anti-Americanism, Russia's pursuit of ties with states which are considered to be sources of destabilization by the West, and has produced a remarkable amount of Russian mischief-making as a show of independence at low cost. This kind of attempt at conducting a "champagne foreign policy on a beer budget" inevitably threatens to become an irritant to the United States and the West.⁶⁴

This kind of mischief-making, on the other hand, includes a serious background of real concerns about NATO enlargement that are widely shared within the political elite.⁶⁵ Tatiana Parkhalina concludes that there is no Russian national consensus against NATO expansion. The Russians, who suffered a national humiliation with the loss of their former status and territories, are now more concerned about the fate of the Russian Diaspora, the profligate trade in natural resources, the restoration of Russia's superpower status, and regaining some national dignity. For this reason, perceptions of Russia as a "beleaguered fortress" are generated by the government to foster a national consensus against NATO and to divert attention from real domestic problems in the political and economic field.⁶⁶

Based on this paradigm, what are the key negative alternatives for such a non-hostile but nuclear outsider in case this sort of "mischief making" develops a momentum of its own ?

⁶⁴ Leon Gouré, "NATO Expansion and Russia: How will their Relations change?", in Stephen J. Blank (editor), *From Madrid to Brussels: Perspectives on NATO Enlargement* (Carlisle Barracks/Penn., Strategic Studies Institute, 15. June 1997), pp. 56-66.

⁶⁵ Alexander A. Sergounin, "Russian Domestic Debate on NATO Enlargement: From Phobia to Damage Limitation", *European Security*, Vol. 6, No.4, (Winter 1997), p. 55-69.

⁶⁶ Tatiana Parkhalina, "Of myths and illusions: Russian perceptions of NATO enlargement", *NATO Review*, No. 3, (May-June 1997), pp.11-15. Available [online] <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9703-3.htm>>.

- Russia's strong nationalistic elements could strengthen the non-democratic opposition and finally stop the process of democratization of a humiliated "Weimar Russia".⁶⁷
- Russia could establish an enlarged sphere of interest among the independent states of the former Soviet Union (what Russians have called their "near abroad"); or
- Russia could intensify its geopolitical relationship with China to establish a new geostrategic balance.

The non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union – Russia's "near abroad" – constitute an additional problem due to official Russian demands that at least these states not be admitted to the alliance.⁶⁸ Hence, NATO has to consider whether it will accept this new "red line" dividing Europe. Doing so would make it impossible to introduce the Baltics as potential new NATO members. From this perspective the 1998 US-Baltic Charter which calls for intensive bilateral multidimensional cooperation appears more as a substitute for NATO memberships that seem to be out of reach.⁶⁹ Finally, for the affected countries a quiet agreement with Russia about its predominance in the "near abroad" would smack of another supposed "Yalta"-type arrangement.⁷⁰ Hence, NATO is facing the second enlargement dilemma: a continued expansion policy as promised would almost certainly alienate Russia from the rest of Europe. But an alienated Russia would

⁶⁷ Paul E. Gallis, *NATO Enlargement: Pro and Con Arguments* (Washington/D.C., CRS Report for Congress, n.d.), p. 3. Available [online] < <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/poppro.htm> >.

⁶⁸ For a detailed analysis of the Russian perceptions of NATO's enlargement threat, see Derek Aver, "NATO Expansion and Russian National Interests", *European Security*, Vol. 7, No. 1, (Spring 1998), pp. 10-54.

⁶⁹ Karl-Heinz Kamp, "NATO Entrapped: Debating the Next Enlargement Round", *Survival*, vol. 40, no. 3, (Autumn 1998), pp. 178-179.

⁷⁰ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed*, p. 138.

probably not succeed in its efforts to democratize and liberalize economically. There is, on the other hand, a high probability that such circumstances will lead in the short term to ambiguity and inconsistency in Russia's policies, with more hostile relations to the West, and in the long term perhaps even to Russia's strategic alignment with China or other Asian powers.

4. The Consensus Principle

The central question of the third enlargement dilemma is whether NATO can include more new members and still retain sufficient cohesion to be effective. With additional members the political, social, cultural and economic diversity will increase to the point where maintaining a consensus within the Alliance will become a great challenge. This includes the growing risk that Allies who strongly oppose a proposed decision would block the consensus and thereby force the other allies who agree on the proposed action to form a coalition of the willing. In regard to this question the thesis follows the analysis of Robert J. Art, who has compared collective defense and collective security organizations (CSO). Referring to NATO's "open door" expansion strategy he concludes:

These foregoing differences between traditional military alliances and genuine CSOs begin to narrow as a defensive alliance grows in size. As it increases the number of members and the geographic scope of operations, the alliance gradually loses its restrictive character and begins to take on the attributes of a CSO. More states and greater territorial coverage mean more contingencies to guard against. The eventual result is that member states have pledged military assistance to prevent circumstances that are more and more remote from their central interest. When the alliance becomes quite large, then the member states are put in the position of guaranteeing practically everyone against practically everything. If the alliance becomes all inclusive for a particular region, it transmutes into a regional CSO.⁷¹

⁷¹ Robert J. Art, "Creating a Disaster: NATO's Open Door Policy", *Political Science Quarterly*, volume 113, number 3, (1998), pp. 395-396.

NATO now has nineteen members and will soon debate further enlargement rounds. The significant threat from a bipolar world with antagonistic political and ideological systems which bound the allies together has disappeared. How will NATO achieve future consensus for action in this post-Cold War environment? According to Art's findings, NATO's problem will be one of size and scale. Moreover, members in one regional area are more concerned about threats in their neighborhood and less interested in those which affect allies in a different area of the alliance's territory. Hence, regionalization in NATO could additionally undermine the viability of the alliance's collective defense guarantee in Article 5.⁷² As Art states:

Its [NATO's] military guarantee, which is the heart of the alliance, will be effectively diluted. Either the member states will formally water it down as NATO enlarges, or they will not honor their military guarantee when their interests dictate ignoring it. Security will no longer be a collective but a divisible enterprise; and at that point, PESODS will be effectively neutered, and NATO will have been destroyed.⁷³

One might argue that we are still far away from the vision of a new NATO covering the whole Eurasian area. However, the answer is that even today NATO occasionally faces problems in reaching a consensus. Why should this improve in the near future if NATO accepts new members with different strategic cultures? Hence, NATO is facing its third enlargement dilemma: additional new members may foster regionalization and fragmentation within the alliance and simultaneously reduce the stickiness of NATO's glue. The next chapter discusses some examples of the regionalization in today's NATO, introducing potential candidates and their advocates.

⁷² Paul E. Gallis, *NATO Enlargement: The Process and Allied Views* (Washington/ D.C., CRS Report for Congress, 1 July 1997), pp. 4-6. Available [online] <<http://www.fas.org/man/crs/gsummary.htm>>.

⁷³ PESODS stands for "Pan-Eurasian Security Organization of Democratic States". Art considers PESODS to be a regional collective security organization like an enlarged future NATO. See Robert J. Art, "Creating a Disaster", p. 398.

5. NATO's Future Expansion

NATO is steadily moving forward to reshape the European security agenda, but there remains the most complex question of "when" to choose "whom" from the group of suitors. NATO still proclaims an "open door" policy to avoid disappointment and frustration within the group of the "have-nots", but will this automatically lead to an enlargement process of indefinite scope and duration?

Between June 1996 and April 1997 the number of formal applicants for NATO membership fell from fifteen to twelve. Beside the already admitted three new members, these states are Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.⁷⁴

- Albania, FYROM, and Slovakia can not currently be regarded as serious candidates for the next enlargement round because of their domestic political instabilities and other special problems.⁷⁵
- The Baltic states - Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – form a special case: they are facing domestic problems in regard to Russian ethnic minorities, border disputes and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. Moreover, Russia regards the Baltic states as a part of its so-called "near abroad" in order to draw a clear dividing line defining its sphere of interest. As discussed before, future enlargement decisions including the Baltic states would most probably alienate Russia and endanger the prospects of embedding Russia in a future European security architecture. Hence, this cost-benefit analysis clearly calls for not including the Baltics in the next NATO extension.

⁷⁴ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed*, p. 118.

⁷⁵ For a detailed analysis of Slovakia and others, see Jeffrey Simon, *NATO Enlargement & Central Europe. A Study in Civil-Military Relations* (Washington/D.C., National Defense University Press, 1996), pp. 253-287.

- Consequently, the “minimal solution” could be to invite Slovenia only. This is a small country which has already achieved a high number of qualifications and which will probably pursue further reform measures. Furthermore, this country would close the geostrategic link to Hungary and serve as a proof for NATO’s proclaimed “open door” policy.
- A “southern option” would consist of Slovenia and Romania. To add Romania would offer additional Black Sea access for NATO – a questionable geostrategic gain, given Turkey’s extensive Black Sea coast. Moreover, Romania’s movement towards democracy since 1996 has made little progress.
- Another alternative – a “reinforced southern option” – could enlarge NATO by Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria.⁷⁶ Bulgaria would be as important as Romania. To include Bulgaria would mean to create a contiguous NATO area from Romania to Turkey. This could remarkably stabilize this region but could also present several risks as described in the next chapter.

The extreme – to include all– seems to be not realistic and unworthy of further consideration. The possibility of inviting Russia is discussed in the last chapter of this thesis. To include the European neutrals – Sweden, Austria, and Finland – seems also not realistic in the short term because none of them has seriously expressed an intention to join NATO.

But besides the fulfillment of requirements and standards political sponsorship has a remarkable influence on the acceptance of new candidates. The analyses of political relationships show the following connections between old NATO members and applicants.⁷⁷ Belgium and Canada support Slovenia’s and Romania’s efforts for membership. Britain prefers a smaller expansion and has indicated that Slovenia’s

⁷⁶ For a detailed description of these options, see Karl-Heinz Kamp, “NATO Entrapped”, pp. 170-186.

⁷⁷ Analyzing the Allies’ national support for future NATO membership, this thesis reflects domestic preferences of 1997.

candidacy would be acceptable. Although this has not been publicly announced, Denmark supports the Baltic states' admission to NATO. France regards Romania as well as Slovenia to be potential stable security anchors in the Balkans against new threats from East Europe and Asia. Germany's former defense minister Volker R  he was an early advocate of NATO expansion. But beside the three endorsed new members, Germany advocates only the candidacy of Romania. Obviously, based on its stressed geostrategic position, Greece fears Muslim fundamentalism. Hence, to stabilize NATO's southern region, Greece favors the candidacy of Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia. Iceland, on the other hand, clearly prefers the northern solution supporting the Baltic states. Directly confronted with instabilities and the rise of Muslim fundamentalism in North Africa and the Balkans, Italy prefers rather a larger than a smaller expansion of the NATO alliance. Hence, Rome strongly advocates the admission of Slovenia and Romania in the next enlargement round. Luxembourg as well as the Netherlands clearly support the additional integration of Slovenia and Romania. Norway is highly dependent on NATO's policy and assets for its national security. For this reason, Norway is very sensitive about any changes in NATO's defense posture. This could be the explanation for Norway's position that no candidate meets the necessary prerequisites for NATO membership in the foreseeable future. Also worried about instabilities in the southern region, Portugal as well as Spain advocate the candidacies of Romania and Slovenia. Besides attempts to combine questions of NATO and EU enlargement, Turkey has already endorsed Romania, Slovenia, and Bulgaria.⁷⁸ Finally, the United States, which at the Madrid summit forcefully pressed to limit entrants, has seemed at times to advocate the Baltic states for candidacy. Or will the January 1998 US-Baltic Charter be more a weak substitute for NATO membership than a first step towards it?

Without making predictions about the "who" and the "when" of the next enlargement round one can identify distinct national approaches among the Allies towards these putative candidates. As a result, the debate about "who" will be invited to

⁷⁸ For further details, see Paul E. Gallis, *NATO Enlargement: The Process and Allied Views*, pp. 9-20.

join the Alliance will probably be influenced not only by geostrategic necessities but also by domestic policy, patronage, and lobbying.

6. Enlargement to What End?

What is the current strategic rationale that explains why the Alliance is expanding? What is the timeframe for further expansions? Should Russia join NATO? These few questions summarize the most complexity NATO is facing during its preparations for the 1999 Washington summit and the next enlargement debate. The last chapter offers some arguments which may be helpful in evaluating possible options.

In order to avoid similar enlargement entrapments in the future NATO would be wise to define and to implement first of all its new Strategic Concept. NATO definitely needs this long term strategic rationale to derive short and medium term objectives, and not only a future enlargement policy. To decide about new candidacies in a vacuum of geostrategic thinking would mean to take the second step before the first. The key questions concern the future core function or functions of the alliance: will NATO keep its collective defense purpose with the fundamental security tasks as formulated in the 1991 Strategic Concept and the amendments of crisis management and peacekeeping or will NATO clearly develop into a collective security organization beyond the European scope? Or will we just see the contractual affirmation of the status quo?

The second prerequisite is to define the long term NATO - Russian relationship: further enlargement debates based on collective security rationales will strongly strive for additional applicants. But this powerful "promote stability path" must avoid the strong and distinctive alienation of Russia from the rest of Europe. Although China does not in the short-run favor a close Sino-Russian strategic alliance, NATO has to include Russia in its efforts to re-construct the future European security architecture. Whether the NATO-Russian Founding Act and the close cooperation in the Partnership for Peace program and other bodies will be sufficient and adequate remains to be seen. But this deepened and widened political cooperation must definitely not give Russia any

possibility to veto NATO's activities or decisions. The question of a possible Russian future membership in NATO brought up different viewpoints between the United States and some European allies. In the short term this membership seems to be an illusory vision. Russia regards itself as a "great power" and perceives itself to be of nearly the same importance for the European security environment as the United States. Russia seeks strategic links with the United States in a special relationship. But in the long term, backed up by a matured democratization process, Russia could also become an equal partner within the Alliance.

Finally, Russia's strategic interests are divided between CIS states, former republics of the former Soviet Union outside the CIS (the Baltic states) and other Central European states. Because of the special geopolitical circumstances of the Baltic states it would be wise for the Alliance to consider postponing the membership of former countries of the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, NATO must explicitly declare and demonstrate that this will not endorse any kind of Russian predominance in the "near abroad". Furthermore, the European Union (EU) could be the key element to integrate these states in the "evolutionary expansion path" based on political and economic criteria in order to avoid any conflict with Russia because EU membership is priced more highly than NATO membership and Russia supports the expansion of the EU.⁷⁹ This leads to the question of why NATO should take the lead in the process of Europe's expansion to the East. NATO would be wise to strive for close and intensive cooperation with some other European institutions, like the OSCE. The close cooperation between interlocking institutions would create opportunities to counter diverse future risks and challenges.

⁷⁹ Michael Mandelbaum, "Unanswered Questions on NATO Expansion", *Global Beat*, Global Beat Issue Brief No. 29 (February 28, 1998). Available [online] <<http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/pubs/ib29.html>>.

D. NATO'S STRATEGIC ORIENTATION

1. The Origins and the Path to the April 1999 Washington Summit

They [the Parties to this treaty] seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.⁸⁰

Created within the framework of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the preamble of the Washington Treaty clearly articulated allied support for democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. The promotion of peace and stability is regarded as an objective equal to the defense purpose. Thus, NATO is much more than an effective alliance oriented to collective defense; it is a political alliance of shared values and common interests with a stabilizing impact in Europe.

This multifunctional approach to maintaining peace and stability for all members through deterrence, adequate military defense, cooperation, and political solidarity is furthermore emphasized within the first articles of the Washington Treaty, which call for

- the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means without threatening international peace and security (Article 1),
- the development of peaceful and friendly international relations, including economic collaboration (Article 2),
- the development of individual as well as common capacities to resist any armed aggression (Article 3),
- the predominance of negotiations and consultations in case of any threat perception of a member (Article 4),

⁸⁰ NATO Office of Information and Press, *NATO Handbook* (1995), Appendix VIII, p. 231.

- finally, the obligation of mutual assistance for any member of the treaty under attack. This created the core of the collective defense purpose of the alliance (Article 5).⁸¹

These basic political functions have from the first moment been the cornerstones of NATO's profile. Based on historical experiences, the Canadians and the Scandinavians in particular attached great importance to Articles 2 and 4 of the Washington Treaty which went far beyond the military aspect of the Alliance.⁸² But based on the experiences of World War II and with the background of the Cold War the military aspect of the Alliance – the deterrence and collective defense purpose – was historically regarded as NATO's primary *raison d'être*, owing to the need to counterbalance Soviet military capabilities and to deter the threat of aggression. During that time NATO's threefold purpose was expressed by Lord Ismay, the Alliance's first Secretary General, as follows: "NATO was designed to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down".⁸³ For nearly eighteen years after NATO's founding in April 1949 the military aspect was at the core of NATO's purpose.

The Alliance's "dual track" strategy received new emphasis in the December 1967 Harmel Report, named after the Belgium Foreign Minister. This report described "The Future Tasks of the Alliance" when the Soviet Union had offered its doctrine of "peaceful coexistence". According to the Harmel Report, NATO has two functions: "Its first function is to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of the member

⁸¹ NATO Office of Information and Press, *NATO Handbook* (1995), Appendix VIII, pp. 231-232.

⁸² For that reason Article 2 is also titled the "Canadian article". For a historic review, see Winfried Heinemann, *Vom Zusammenwachsen des Bündnisses: Die Funktionsweise der NATO in ausgewählten Krisenfällen 1951-1956* (München, Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), pp. 1-5 and pp. 244-246.

⁸³ Cited in David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed*, p. 52.

countries if aggression should occur.”⁸⁴ The second function was described as “to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved.”⁶⁹ After this reorientation NATO rested on a balanced policy between defense and détente as two complementary and equal elements. But the dramatic changes during the late 1980s and the early 1990s as described in Chapter II of this thesis made new adaptations necessary.

The 1990 “London Declaration on a Transformed NATO” again emphasized the political dimension of the Alliance, reaffirming

... that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, and we [the Allies] intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance as provided for by Article 2 of our treaty.⁸⁵

In line with this intention and the political reality at hand, the Alliance also declared that NATO and the Warsaw Pact were no longer adversaries. According to the changed political role of the Alliance, NATO committed itself to the peaceful resolution of future disputes, emphasized the importance of arms control and reductions talks, and announced changes in its force structure as well as its strategy. NATO’s transformation led finally to a strategic review which established the Alliance’s Strategic Concept published at the 1991 Rome summit. The preceding strategic review was not without controversy. Many allied officials did not see any necessity to change or even adapt NATO’s strategy. SACEUR, for instance, foresaw only the need to review the operational concept but not the strategic rationale because of its flexibility to meet slight changes in the security environment.⁸⁶ Later, after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, it became clear that this was not just an evolutionary process but more a revolution in

⁸⁴ North Atlantic Council, *The Future Tasks of the Alliance* (Brussels, 13/14 December 1967), Ministerial Communiqué. Available [online] <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/c671213b.htm>>.

⁸⁵ North Atlantic Council, *London Declaration on a Transformed NATO* (London, 5 - 6 July 1990). Available [online] <<http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/c900706a.htm>>.

⁸⁶ Rob de Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the new Millenium*, p. 15.

European security structures. The work on the strategy review was difficult because everything was in flux. Germany's reunification, for instance, made the former principle of "forward defense" impossible to honor due to the ban on stationing foreign conventional forces and any nuclear forces in the new "Bundesländer". The August 1991 attempted Russian coup d'état raised again the question of the most significant future security risks. Internal quarrels about the responsibility for the work also delayed the review. Finally, after an intensive iterative process the ad hoc Strategy Review Group produced the new strategic concept which was adopted in November 1991.⁸⁷ Besides the description of the new strategic environment and the enhanced security "challenges and risks" as expressions to replace the former "security threats", this concept expanded the Harmel Report's dual approach of defense and dialogue into the threefold concept of dialogue, cooperation, and collective defense. The newly added cooperative role received its practical application with the internal and external adaptations discussed in chapter II of this thesis. Furthermore, this new and fully defensively-oriented strategic concept described NATO's future core security functions – now named "fundamental security tasks" – as

- To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.
- To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

⁸⁷ A very detailed analysis of the development of this new 1991 strategy was published by Rob de Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the new Millenium*, pp. 13-47.

- To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.
- To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.⁸⁸

This first post-Cold War review gave up also the concept of “forward defense”, which had been a long-standing prerequisite for effective defense. There is no doubt that this altogether represented a new course for NATO. European security was now based on a broad approach including political, military, social, and environmental elements. But at the same time the last fundamental task of counterbalancing the Soviet threat demonstrates how fast parts of this concept were overtaken by reality. Less than two months after this concept was adopted the Soviet system collapsed and the following political changes made thoughts of European security embedded in zero sum assumptions an anachronism. The new concept had already been partially overtaken by events when it was adopted in November 1991. Nonetheless, several previous elements proved to be still relevant and have the potential to shape NATO’s future evolution. Their significance and prospects are analyzed in the next chapter.

2. Outline of NATO’s Future Strategic Concept

At the 1997 Madrid summit the Heads of State and Government reaffirmed their decision, already announced in the May 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, to examine NATO’s 1991 Strategic Concept “to ensure that it is fully consistent with Europe’s new security situation and challenges” and to “confirm our commitment to the core function

⁸⁸ Paragraph 21 of the Strategic Concept refers only to preserving “the strategic balance within Europe”, whereas paragraph 14 specifies that “Soviet military capability and build-up potential, including its nuclear dimension, still constitute the most significant factor of which the Alliance has to take account in maintaining the strategic balance in Europe. NATO, *NATO Handbook* (1995), appendix IX. For a detailed analysis of these fundamental tasks, see Jan Petersen, “NATO’s next strategic concept”, *NATO Review*, Vol. 46, No. 2, (Summer 1998), pp. 18-22. Available [online] <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9802-06.htm>>.

of Alliance collective defense and the indispensable transatlantic link.”⁸⁹ The North Atlantic Council approved Terms of Reference (ToR) in December 1997. These ToR are the basis for the efforts of NATO’s Policy Coordinating Group (PCG), which has been reviewing the current concept since early 1998 with regard to updates as necessary. To ensure that the above political guidance for NATO’s responsibilities will be met the PCG will have to examine a number of important questions such as:

- The formulation of NATO’s future core functions, now named fundamental tasks, and the relationship between its political and military tasks.
- Within the area of NATO’s military tasks the determination of the relationship between the basic function of collective defense and non-Article 5 tasks, such as crisis management and peace operations.⁹⁰ This should also address the question of how to define the scope of NATO’s geographical interests and responsibilities “out of area”.
- The definition as well as the practical designing of new tasks, such as non-proliferation and counter-proliferation of WMD or the Alliance’s objectives in the Mediterranean initiative.
- The determination of the future role of the Alliance’s nuclear weapons.
- The settlement of the tension between an “open door” enlargement policy and close and intensive cooperation with the Russian Federation.
- The agreement on a legal basis for future non-Article 5 operations which could include the reaffirmation of the NATO-UN and the NATO-OSCE relationships.

⁸⁹ NATO, *Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation*, no.19. Other scholars see the starting point of this development already in the 1991 Declaration of Rome. See, for instance, Rob de Wijk, “Towards a new political strategy for NATO”, *NATO Review*, Vol. 46, No. 2, (Summer 1998), pp. 18-22. Available [online] <<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9802-05.htm>>.

⁹⁰ In this thesis the term “peace operations” covers the wide area of peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcing, peace-building, and humanitarian support operations.

- The definition of NATO's role and function in developing the future European security environment with regard to its relationship towards other European institutions also engaged in this process.⁹¹

In sum, there seem to exist three conceivable ways for the Alliance to move forward after this strategic review. A narrow solution would favor only modest adaptations. This would be more an update replacing "Soviet Union" by "Russian Federation" and adding peacekeeping and crisis management.⁹² A more evolutionary way would be a comprehensive review of the current concept, keeping still relevant elements but replacing irrelevant ones and adding those new missions the Alliance can agree on. A broad solution would be a more revolutionary way and lead to an entirely new concept addressing a wide variety of new challenges.

At present all received signals hint at the center of the above spectrum.⁹³ In their Final Communiqués in December 1998 NATO's Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministers described the Alliance's future capabilities to enhance security and stability namely including "dialogue, cooperation and partnership and, where appropriate, non-Article 5

⁹¹ N.N., *NATO's Strategy Review: A Litmus Test for NATO-Russia Relations*, Research Note 97.5, (Berlin, Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security, December 1997), pp. 2-3. Available [online] <[http:// www.basicint.org/natostrat.htm](http://www.basicint.org/natostrat.htm)>.

⁹² An example of this kind of review might be the draft of a possible new strategic concept produced by some analysts of the British American Security Information Council (BASIC). See Tassos Kokkinides, Alistair Millar, Daniel Plesch, Kirsten Ruecker, *A New Strategic Concept for NATO*, Basic Papers No. 20, (20 May 1997). Available [online] <[http:// www.basicint.org/bpaper20.htm](http://www.basicint.org/bpaper20.htm)>. This approach was completely changed with a new research report in early 1999. Compare to footnote no. 96.

⁹³ This impression is also bolstered by the fact that NATO published only two months in advance of the Washington summit its new Handbook – the 50th anniversary edition. This would really make no sense if the future strategic concept presented during this summit would be totally different from the statements included in NATO's new handbook.

crisis response operations...with the possible participation of partners.”⁹⁴ This impression is reinforced by the Final Communiqué of the ministerial meeting of the Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group, which stated that the

... Force Goals address requirements for collective defense and deterrence, and capabilities for crisis management, including peace support operations...and capabilities to deal with the risks from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery.⁹⁵

Beside this aspect Julianne Smith and Martin Butcher state in their detailed research report that, according to NATO officials, the Alliance is preparing the following six documents:

- *The new Strategic Concept,*
- *A Vision Statement on the Future of European Security,*
- *Document on NATO's Open Door and Enlargement Policies,*
- *Document on NATO Defense Capabilities Initiative*
- *Document on Weapons on Mass Destruction*
- *Document on the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)*

The authors complete this list with two additional papers which are believed to be missing:

⁹⁴ NATO, *Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council* (Brussels, 8. December 1998), no.5. Available [online] <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98/208c.htm>>. Idem., *Final Communiqué of the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministers Session* (Brussels, 17. December 1998), no. 19. Available [online] <[http:// www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-152e.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p98-152e.htm)>.

⁹⁵ NATO, *Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group* (Brussels, 11. June 1998), No. 3. Available [online] <[http:// www.nato.int/docu/1998/p98-072e.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/1998/p98-072e.htm)>.

- *NATO Policy for Crisis Management and Security Sector Reform, and*
- *A Comprehensive Concept for Arms Control and Disarmament.*⁹⁶

The findings, conclusions, and recommendations of this research report with regard to NATO's new Strategic Concept have already been introduced to the reader with reference to the work of the Policy Coordinating Group. For this reason, the following section of the Chapter analyzes in detail two of the controversial topics in the current review process.

3. The "Core Function" Discussion

NATO's core functions – in the 1991 Strategic Concept named as "fundamental security tasks" – are steadily discussed within the Alliance. The development and changes in the Alliance's core functions may be explained with the following schema:




Figure 2: Development of NATO's core functions

⁹⁶ Julianne Smith; Martin Butcher, *A Risk Reduction Strategy for NATO*, BASIC Research Report 99.1 (January 1999), pp. 7-8. Available [online] <<http://www.basicint.org/natorr.htm>>.

The Alliance has followed ever since its foundation a multipurpose approach towards security as defined in the Washington Treaty. But during the Cold War, owing to its preoccupation with the Soviet threat, NATO's defense posture gained absolute priority. The Harmel Report in 1967 managed to re-introduce "dialogue" with the Warsaw Pact as a second pillar of NATO. But with the emphasis on its defense posture it is no wonder that with the historical changes at the end of the Cold War period some scholars regarded NATO to be without its traditional military *raison d'être* and from their viewpoint, thus, without perspective. Against this background the catchword "out of area or out of business" was created. Contrary to some institutional theory assumptions, the Alliance managed to survive by adapting itself in a process of widening and broadening. The 1991 Strategic Concept was still based on the classical function of "dialogue" and "defense" but it added "cooperation" as a new element. Moreover, it also included the objective of balancing Soviet power within Europe. This led to an enhanced collective defense approach which was complemented by the additional, new elements of peacekeeping and crisis management. In *The NATO Handbook* published in late 1998, NATO outlines the Alliance's fundamental security tasks as follows:

- It provides an indispensable foundation for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes. It seeks to create an environment in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.
- In accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, it serves as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues affecting the vital interests of its members, including developments which might pose risks to their security. It facilitates coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.
- It provides deterrence and defense against any form of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.

- It promotes security and stability by pursuing permanent and active cooperation with all its Partners through Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and through consultation, cooperation and partnership with Russia and Ukraine.
- It promotes understanding of the factors relating to international security and of the objectives of cooperation in this field, through active information programs in Alliance and Partner countries as well as through initiatives such as the Mediterranean Dialogue.⁹⁷

Beside the fact that the three first functions (“dialogue”, “defense”, and “cooperation”) are formulated with almost exactly the same wording as in the 1991 Strategic Concept, the Alliance added “partnership” and “information”. But this enumeration of fundamental security tasks did not include non-Article 5 operations, such as crisis response interventions, which are mentioned in the Final Communiqués of the Defense and Foreign Minister Meetings in December 1998. But, as with the 1991 Strategic Concept, these additional elements are introduced in those paragraphs which follow the enumeration of the Alliance’s fundamental tasks describing these tasks and other missions in detail.

This new Strategic Concept should remain relevant long into the next millenium, but it will probably not lead NATO to an exclusively collective security approach as some scholars assume. New and still relevant old elements – namely the collective defense purpose – will create a new security rationale which can be best named as “cooperative security”. Deterrence, defense and purely military aspects of security are necessary but not sufficient to guarantee peace and stability in Europe. Strong cooperative and combined efforts are needed to overcome dividing lines and old thinking. Moreover, beside the definition of non-Article 5 operations, the new Strategic Concept ought to define the relationship between these missions and NATO’s “out of area” zone

⁹⁷ NATO, *The NATO Handbook* (1998), pp. 24-25.

of interest and responsibility. Should this really include the whole Euro-Atlantic area or are there different security priorities? To what extent should the Alliance look beyond the Euro-Atlantic area – for instance, to the Middle East or Persian Gulf region? While the United States and Britain are pushing for the acceptance of missions beyond collective defense in support of allied interests outside of the NATO territory, some other allies, such as France, Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Italy, are strongly opposing this vision. In the end, the example of allied engagement in Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrates that this quarrel has been to some extent overtaken by events. This is shown in the following discussion of the legal basis for allied action in non-Article 5 combat operations. Moreover, the Alliance should determine if and when NATO should deal with new challenges as outlined above. Are “out of area” threats such as international terrorism, mass migration, or ecological problems really in NATO’s area of responsibility or just in its area of interest, as outlined in the NATO-Russian Founding Act? Today the Alliance seems not to be ready to act “out of area” en bloc.

4. Authorization versus Self-mandating

One of the most intensively debated issues with regard to the new Strategic Concept is the potential need for UN Security Council authorization for NATO non-Article 5 missions involving the use of force. Already the fact that this point is still debated is surprising with regard to the Alliance’s basic document:

The parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations ...⁹⁸

This very first sentence of the preamble of the Washington Treaty clearly demonstrates the primacy of the United Nations. This gets emphasized in Article 7 of the Washington Treaty:

⁹⁸ NATO, *The NATO Handbook* (1998), p. 395.

The Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.⁹⁹

NATO's founding document, the Washington Treaty, is actually studded with clear signs of the primacy of the United Nations and the UN Security Council. As a countermove this primacy is also clearly defined in Article 39 of the UN Charter:

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken ... to maintain or restore international peace and security.¹⁰⁰

But a clear need to set this topic on the agenda and to discuss it came most recently with the case of the Kosovo conflict. The United Nations, still under the fresh impression of its lost credibility through the Bosnia debacle, tried to avoid major errors with a distinctive diplomacy. Consequently, UN Security Council Resolution 1160 of 31 March 1998 condemned the use of force by both Serb police forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). It established a weapons embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), including Kosovo, but it also very clearly demanded that a negotiated solution be "based on the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."¹⁰¹ After nearly six more months of brutal coercion, fighting and ethnic cleansing, UN Security Council Resolution 1199 was adopted on 23 September 1998. It expressed serious concern about

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 379.

¹⁰⁰ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations*, Chapter VII, Article 39. Available [online] <<http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/chapter7.html>>.

¹⁰¹ United Nations, *Resolution 1160 (1998). Adopted by the Security Council at its 3868th meeting on 31 March 1998*. Available [online] <<http://www.un.org/plweb-cgi/iopcode.p>>.

... the recent intense fighting in Kosovo and in particular the excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army which have resulted in numerous civilian casualties and ... the displacement of over 230,000 persons from their homes.¹⁰²

Again, the resolution emphasized the desirability of a peaceful solution but warned that the behavior of the Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav army constituted a threat to peace and security in the region. The FRY was ordered to cease all action of its security forces, enable international monitoring, facilitate the safe return of refugees, and create a time table for the dialogue with the Kosovo Albanian community in favor of a political solution. The Kosovo Albanian leadership, on the other side, was asked to condemn all terrorist acts and to emphasize peaceful means. Finally, the UN Security Council precisely and clearly

... decides, should the concrete measures demanded in this resolution and resolution 1160 (1998) not be taken, to consider further action and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region.¹⁰³

None of the above UN Security Council resolutions on Kosovo explicitly approved the use of force. For that reason, UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, pointed out with respect to the events in Kosovo:

Credible force without legitimacy may have immediate results, but will not enjoy long-term international support. Legitimate force without credibility may enjoy universal support but prove unable to implement the basic provisions of its mandate. Combined, however, under the umbrella of a United Nations mandate, credibility and legitimacy in the use of force can create lasting peace.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² United Nations, *Resolution 1199 (1998)*. Adopted by the Security Council at its 3930th meeting on 23 September 1998. Available [online] <<http://www.un.org/plweb-cgi/since.cgi?dbname=scres&foryear=1998>>.

¹⁰³ United Nations, *Resolution 1199 (1998)*, paragraph 16.

¹⁰⁴ Kofi Annan cited in UN Press Release SG/SM/6598 (New York, 15 June 1998). Available [online] <<http://www.un.org/plweb-cgi/iopcode.p>>.

Regardless of these concerns and the reservations of the UN Security Council resolution 1199, in the middle of October 1998 NATO Secretary General Javier Solana declared:

The Allies believe that in the particular circumstances with respect to the present crisis in Kosovo as described in UNSC Resolution 1199, there are legitimate grounds for the Alliance to threaten, and if necessary, to use force.¹⁰⁵

During a remarkable change of attitude in September and October 1998 many allies based this different approach and explanation for the use of force in the Kosovo conflict on the “legitimate” basis of humanitarian help. The German case might serve as an example. Dr. Klaus Kinkel, then the German Foreign Minister, declared in an interview with a German radio station on 24 September 1998 that a possible future military strike against Belgrade would need a solid legal basis. This necessary basis, obviously another UN Security Council resolution, would in any case be found.¹⁰⁶ This attitude changed within the next few weeks. On 16 October 1998, Dr. Kinkel declared in a policy statement in front of the German Bundestag that all NATO partners agreed on the mutual and common understanding that UN Security Council resolution 1199 clearly justifies the use of force. With this decision, Kinkel added, NATO did not create a new instrument which is a general power of attorney for NATO’s future interventions.¹⁰⁷ The statement itself sounds more like an excuse than a justification.

¹⁰⁵ NATO, *Transcript of the Press Conference by Secretary General, Dr. Javier Solana* (Brussels, 13 October 1998). Available [online] <<http://www.nato>>.

¹⁰⁶ Auswärtiges Amt, *Interview zur Kosovo-Resolution des Weltsicherheitsrates* (Bonn, 24. September 1998). Available [online] <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/6_archiv/index.htm>.

¹⁰⁷ Auswärtiges Amt, *Regierungserklärung zur deutschen Beteiligung an einem möglichen Einsatz der NATO im Kosovo Konflikt* (Bonn, 16. Oktober 1998). Available [online] <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/6_archiv/2/r/R981016A.htm>.

These statements and objections were overtaken by events. On March 24, 1999, NATO started to launch combined air attacks targeted against objectives all over the FRY. Beside its military implications this was a clear political signal of how the West evaluates Russia's reluctance to react militarily and Russia's global importance. While the European governments largely favor NATO's action, Russian President Boris Yeltsin condemned the operation, ordered Russia's chief military representative to NATO to return to Moscow, and announced a suspension in Russian participation in the PfP program and in NATO-Russian cooperation, which obviously relates to the PJC. Russian Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov canceled his official trip to Washington, which aimed at the extension of Russia's financial support by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Besides the uncertain Russian reactions to the fighting in Kosovo, this tendency strongly suggests that Russia may pursue a new isolationism policy marked by deteriorating relations with Washington and Brussels.

The Kosovo conflict and NATO's reaction will have a decisive influence on the Alliance's future. The US administration wishes NATO to be paramount in a wider geographical area and based on the UN Charter, with the UN Security Council as a source of desirable but not indispensable authorization. The US argument is that NATO should not be subject to a Russian or Chinese veto in the UN Security Council. Some Europeans strictly oppose such an extension of NATO's responsibilities, especially without a UN Security Council legitimization. Norway and Turkey, for instance, are reluctant to endorse any changes in the current strategic rationale due to their high dependence on current arrangements. France and Germany follow similar prerequisites with regard to the question of mandating such operations. Germany has constitutional obligations to engage militarily abroad on the basis of a UN Security Council or OSCE authorization and the simple majority approval of the Bundestag.¹⁰⁸ Against the background of NATO's Kosovo engagement Germany adopted the idea that exceptions

¹⁰⁸ See Dr. Klaus Kinkel, *Konsequenzen aus dem Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 12. Juli 1994* (Bonn, Erlrung der Bundesregierung in der 240. Sitzung des Deutschen Bundestages am 22. Juli 1994), p. 4.

to these prerequisites must be admitted to prevent humanitarian catastrophes. France's Minister of Defense, Alain Richard, also clearly emphasizes the predominance of the UN Security Council, declaring that

We [the French] remain firmly attached to the legitimacy for any non-Article 5 operation implying recourse to force provided by the authority of the UN Security Council, the sole legitimate and indisputable organ for a resort to force and for effecting a delegation [of authority to use force] to a regional organization. This formula, which is consistent with international law, has demonstrated its flexibility, because it was possible to place our action in Kosovo in 1998 within its scope, a proof that it does not in the least imply passivity, once we know how to use it with effectiveness. But we have in this case reached the extreme limits of this flexibility, and on an exceptional basis, because it concerned a case of humanitarian necessity.¹⁰⁹

Finally, NATO's actions in the Kosovo conflict are increasingly overshadowing the review of the Alliance's Strategic Concept. The formulations in the new Strategic Concept might be influenced by the precedents set in the Kosovo conflict, and there might be increased temptations and less resistance to embarking on similar missions in the future. Alternatively, setbacks in Kosovo may make the Allies increasingly cautious and selective about undertaking non-Article 5 missions, and more determined to insure that they have a solid basis in international law. The interpretation of NATO's behavior in the Kosovo conflict as the result of an exceptional reaction to deal with a humanitarian emergency can be accepted.¹¹⁰ But will this set a precedent for future NATO activities? Will it *de facto* be a remarkable change in the traditional understanding of the Alliance's core functions and lead the allies to the problem of finding a consensus about the question

¹⁰⁹ Alain Richard, *Discours sur l'avenir de l'Alliance Atlantique, à l'occasion de la 35ème conférence sur la politique de sécurité* (Munich, 5-7 February 1999). Translation by David S. Yost, Professor of international relations at the Naval Postgraduate School.

¹¹⁰ Some experts in international law state that humanitarian intervention can only be conducted on the legal basis of a UN Security Council resolution. See Michael Bothe, "Friedenssicherung und Kriegsrecht", in Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum, *Völkerrecht* (Berlin and New York, 1997), p. 599.

– freedom fighter or terrorist? For this reason, the review of NATO's Strategic Concept must not only give a clear idea of its future missions but also give the Alliance a renewed sense of legitimacy. This could be the opportunity to redefine NATO's relations with the United Nations and the OSCE and to divide responsibilities among these three security organizations.

IV. NATO AFTER THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT

The Alliance is currently preparing for its summit in Washington in April 1999. At this summit, which will mark NATO's 50th anniversary, the allies will welcome the three new members and celebrate its historic achievements. This summit will also provide the opportunity to define NATO's role, function, and self-image in and for the European security architecture. As the analysis has shown the Atlantic Alliance is simultaneously facing some outstanding issues, questions, and problems at hand. The successful solution of some key issues in the months and years ahead will be the determinants for the security environment of Europe.

NATO's commitment to an open enlargement process includes some pitfalls. The enlargement debate did not end when Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic entered the Alliance in March 1999. The following enlargement debates will be characterized by strong national lobbyists for preferred candidates. This scenario tends to have rather divisive and paralyzing effects because it will be based on political rather than on geostrategic military arguments. Additional new members will tend to regionalize the Alliance and thereby burden the intra-alliance relationships. Apart from further accessions to the Alliance the enlargement process will create at least institutional dividing lines. New and old NATO members will face those European nations not invited to join the Alliance. As the enlargement process moves forward the question of membership for countries which formerly belonged to the Soviet Union will pose enormous problems. Since it continues to be opposed across the entire Russian political spectrum, NATO must handle its expansion with utmost care. At the April 1999 summit the Alliance should be very selective, invite at most only one country, and adopt a "pause and think" policy, postponing the next extended enlargement round for years to come. Otherwise, enlargement could ruin NATO, in terms of losing focus, cohesion, and the ability for consensus.

Consequently, NATO has to make efforts to embed the Russian Federation in its Euro-Atlantic security structures as an equal partner. This is simultaneously one of the

reasons for a strong transatlantic link and a future US engagement in Europe. Basic cooperation structures such as the Permanent Joint Council or the PfP initiative must increasingly be used to stabilize the relationship with Russia before further expansion initiatives beyond the current “red lines” can be launched. Russia’s current critical reassessment of existing cooperative structures should be seen as a serious signal. This must not lead to a Russian veto right over NATO’s decision making process, but it must not lead to Russia’s alienation from – and isolation within – Europe either. Intensified consultations and cooperation must seek to stabilize NATO’s relations with Russia in the years to come. What are the promising areas for military cooperation where NATO’s security can be enhanced? Some scholars have already suggested Russia’s participation in NATO’s decision-making process for non-Article 5 activities.¹¹¹ But from a strategic culture perspective, to say nothing of a lack of consensus in NATO for such an arrangement, Russia’s possible “seat and vote” in the North Atlantic Council seems to be premature. Russia’s integration into the European peace process is a highly ambitious objective which has suffered a serious setback during the latest incidents in the Kosovo crisis. NATO’s challenge at hand is to overcome this current Russian irritation in order to avoid long-term self-isolationism tendencies in Moscow.

Many countries wishing to join NATO are looking for hard security guarantees. They see NATO as the old-fashioned guarantor for collective defense against the perceived Russian threat. Simultaneously, the rest of the Alliance is trying to maintain a deepened NATO-Russian cooperation. Managing NATO with this set of partners with different views and expectations – reflecting distinct strategic cultures – will become increasingly difficult. Moreover, processes of regionalization within NATO due to different strategic interests will make this challenge even more significant and demanding. Will the level of cohesion decrease and to what extent will this be acceptable for the Alliance?

¹¹¹ See, for instance, Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg, *Sicherheit in einem ungeteilten Europa. Die NATO-Osterweiterung als Chance nutzen* (Hamburg, März 1997), pp. 3-4.

There is a tremendous difference between the ability to generate consensus to respond to an Article 5 attack on a member and the ability to generate and sustain consensus to deploy NATO forces engaging in crisis management, peace support operations, or even combat operations outside of NATO's territory – "out of area". But being beyond the Alliance's area of formal responsibility does not simultaneously mean being beyond its area of strategic or even vital interest. The Allies should neither allow non-Article 5 operations to assume a global character nor should they impose artificial geographic limits on such missions.¹¹² Furthermore, common democratic norms and values which define mutual strategic interests and the political willingness to act in a coalition or alliance are the real glue of NATO. But will NATO's glue keep its stickiness when it is diluted by a number of new members? Moreover, national interests and objectives – including manifestations of strategic cultures - are not static. Developing confidence in effective and legitimate arrangements will be the most important contribution that NATO can make for the future stability and security within Europe and beyond Europe's boundaries.

All of the above developments relate to NATO's future strategic orientation and, indeed, to the very purpose of NATO in the years to come. As a result the revision of the Alliance's Strategic Concept must set out NATO's future missions and the Alliance's future character. In the past NATO emphasized the concept of collective defense but today and in the future it seems to be oriented more towards a collective security approach giving growing importance to non-Article 5 operations and defending values and interests, not just territory. In redefining these priorities NATO would be wise to keep collective defense as its key business. Other missions – for instance, the proliferation threat or the challenges of international terrorism – could be added but must always show a clear subordination to NATO's collective defense core function. Since no definition of the future purpose of the Alliance will be fully shared by all allies and since the Alliance simultaneously is facing an increasing variety of future challenges, will the

¹¹² William V. Roth, *NATO in the 21st Century*, p. 7.

next Strategic Concept be able to contain more than a minimum denominator of political solidarity and cohesion?

The Strategic Concept review also provides an opportunity to define NATO's sense of legitimacy and to re-define the Alliance's relationship with the United Nations as well as with other European organizations and institutions. Some observers see NATO's current Kosovo engagement as a precedent for allied action not only "out of area" but also "out of legitimacy". Would the Alliance be willing to accept similar behavior from other states or alliances? The selective interpretation of the obligations of the United Nations Charter could seriously undermine NATO's goal of preserving justice and the international legal order. A Russian or Chinese UN Security Council veto, however, could easily block any NATO action. For this reason, the Alliance ought to distinguish and define precisely the kinds of non-Article 5 operations it envisages and the expected legal basis for such action. Firm criteria for action, which must be applied in every case, should be drawn up. Otherwise, the Alliance would not be able to act cohesively in non-Article 5 operations; this would emphasize the role of "coalitions of the willing" and reduce the Alliance's future importance.

Finally, the Russian Federation serves as an example to demonstrate that NATO must not always have the lead in the expansion of Western and West European institutions. Why should Russia, due to its economic problems, not first be invited to join the EU? All European institutions were more or less single-purpose organizations during the Cold War period. In order to deal with the challenges and risks of the new millenium these institutions should develop a clear mission-profile as well as close cooperation ties. The realization that security has economic, social, cultural, environmental, and defense elements gives rebirth to the idea of interlocking institutions in an environment of cooperative security.¹¹³ According to Rob de Wijk,

¹¹³ Rob de Wijk, "Towards a new political strategy for NATO", pp. 14-18.

The heart of this is mutual economic, socio-cultural and military co-operation between an ever-increasing group of countries. The object of co-operative security is to anticipate potential conflicts and prevent them breaking out, or to actively strive to suppress conflicts once they have broken out by means of joint international action within the system.¹¹⁴

Cooperative security tries to harmonize the cooperation of coalitions of the willing with the set of existing treaty-based security institutions in different areas of interest and responsibilities. It includes treaty-bound assistance such as NATO's Article 5 military obligations as well as non-treaty-bound voluntary participation. For that reason, cooperative security is based on the participants' willingness to engage, on a system of common norms, on common standards of conduct, and on confidence-building measures. Countries must furthermore be answerable for failures to respect these common grounds; and the cooperative security community should develop instruments for intervention in cases of norm- and standard-violating behavior. The elements, the interplay of institutions, and their interdependence are at present not completely defined. But if NATO wants to be one of the leading, most active, and successful security organizations in Europe, it will have to find its place and role in this cooperative security architecture.

¹¹⁴ Rob de Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the New Millenium*, p. 143.

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